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Researches on impacts of the banking sector on economic performance are not only 
provided for those developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Germany, and Japan, but also for those developing economies, such as South 
American, Asian and Eastern European countries. In this research, empirical 
approach has been adopted to explain the monetary transmission mechanism to 
document the characteristics of the bank lending channel in China since her 
implementation of the open-door policy. We study how bank loans are transmitted 
into changes in the economy reflected by variables such as real GDP and inflation. 
Furthermore, the key economic variable of aggregate investment is decomposed into 
domestic investment and foreign direct investment in the bank lending channel to 
study their relationship. Our research comprises two sets of data: first, aggregate 
time-series data from 1994 Quarter 1 to 2002 Quarter 3 with emphasis on recent 
economic performance of China and second, unbalanced annual panel data from 
1978 to 2002 of provinces are categorized into different regional blocks. 
Inter-regional comparison is followed by the Granger causality tests. It is found that 
these two approaches of using the aggregate time -series and panel vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models give quite different results. The favored panel VAR 
model provides rich dynamic results which strongly support the hypothesis of 
multi-directional causality cycle in bank lending channel for China. Also results of 
causality tests are varied across different regions. The study concludes by with 
addressing the main issues and policy implications behind the findings. 
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I 
warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The Chinese economy started the economic reforms and open-door policy and 
became a mixture of capitalist economy and planned economy after 1979. During the 
past twenty years, the Chinese economy has undergone many aspects of most 
dramatic changes since the reform. Within the last decades, China has become an 
economic power with a gross domestic product approaching that of the United States, 
and has risen to be one of the world’s largest capital importer and absorber. Figure 
1.1 has shown the GDP growth rate of China pre- and post- economic reform 





































































Figure 1.1 GDP Growth Rate of China from 1952 to 2002
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The banks are the backbone of China’s financial system. Even though China’s 
economic boom has reached another peak in the post-Deng era, the potential banking 
crisis began to unfold gradually and steadily; many discussions have largely been 
dominated by the necessity and the essence of the financial system reform, which in 
turn led to changes of the monetary transmission mechanism in China.  
 
Table 1.1 Loan loss reserves and non-performing loans in 1990-1995 
Non-performing loans Loan loss reserves
as a percentage of total loans as a percentage of total loans
China 25 1






United States 3.3 1
Country / Region
Source: Tong (2002), The Heart of Economic Reform: China's Banking Reform and State Enterprise Restructing ,
               The Chinese Economy Series, England: ASHGATE Publication
 
The imperfections and inefficiencies in the banking system of China are ascribed to 
the corruption and vulnerabilities of the response to political and administrational 
pressure. Banks credits have been offered to well-connected borrowers who are 
unlikely to repay their debts. Borrowers do not expect to have to repay loans. Worse 
still, borrowers can even access more loans regardless of their reliability or 
creditworthiness. They may continue to borrow and spend even if the interest rates 
increase. The problematic non-performing loans (NPLs) led to Chinese banks being 
unable to collect timely payment of interest and principal on more than 40 percent of 
their loans in early 2004 (Bradsher, 2004). The ratio of NPLs in China is 
substantially higher than its counterparts before the Asian financial crisis as shown in 
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Table 1.1. China also has a very low level of loan loss provisions, which means that 
it is impossible to write off these bad assets using the banks’ own loan loss reserves. 
(Tong 2002) 
 
Hence, considering the factors and conditions stated above, it is of strong interest to 
examine the monetary transmission mechanism of China to see how the banking 
sector affects her aggregate economic performance.  
 
The motivation and limitations of this research is illustrated in Section 1.2. 
Following that, the research framework is provided in Section 1.3. Finally, an 
overview in Section 1.4 introduces the structure and organization of the whole thesis. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Limitations 
We make contributions to the discussion of Chinese performance by focusing on one 
distinct aspect of China’s economy — the mechanism of monetary transmission, 
which comprises many features of China’s past success as well as crucial elements of 
the transformation process today. This focus has many advantages. 
 
Chinese banks have to quickly adapt to changing circumstances of the economic 
reforms and have to perpetually transform themselves in order to survive. Hence, the 
evolution of the bank lending channels that are central to the developments of 
Chinese economy is in many respects leading to changes that propagate over time to 
economic sectors and institutions. Hence we need to identify and examine these 
changes. Furthermore, the bank lending channel is a well-suited testing ground based 
on a wide range of reliable and publicly available data necessary for empirical 
research on both aggregate and regional levels. The quarterly and annual data that we 
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have compiled for our analysis allows us to assess the advantages of time series and 
panel data analysis. It thus gives us the opportunity to test factors that could not have 
been observed in most of the previous data sets. 
 
To summarize, changes in the Chinese economy, resulting from new and transformed 
domestic and international pressures, are likely to be reflected in the reactions of 
banks and firms. Data that comprise these reactions are readily available. Thus, an 
empirical investigation of how the bank lending channel works may provide one of 
the best possible insights into the changes in the Chinese economic system as a 
whole. 
 
1.3 Research Framework 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the Chinese economy with 
well-grounded economic foundations that takes account of specific features of the 
Chinese economy in general and relationships among all variables in the Chinese 
economy in particular.  
 
In the credit view literature of monetary economics, there is a transmission 
mechanism that provides information as to how monetary policy transmits into the 
macroeconomic performance through some intermediate factors such as bank loans 
in the bank -lending channel. In this research, we try to expand such a one-way 
causality mechanism to a multi-directional one. We argue that there should be 
interactive relationships among all variables in this mechanism. Economic activities 
and monetary policies should have both direct and indirect dynamic interactions with 
each other. 
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We do not promise simple answers to some of the most difficult questions 
surrounding the workings and stylized facts of the Chinese bank lending channel. By 
putting particular emphasis on the recent changes of China’s financial markets, we 
want to shed more light on what the relevant picture of the bank lending channel is, 




The goal of this study is to provide a reasonable description and testable theory, 
which attempts to give a clear understanding of the complicated system of the bank 
lending channel in a dynamic environment of deregulated financial markets. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter reviews 
literatures of traditional monetary transmission mechanism and subsequently the 
formation of a new view of the mechanism. 
 
The third chapter develops a new theoretical framework of the research. It 
commences with the revision of the classical model of monetary transmission 
mechanism, the Keynesian model. The legal and institutional changes of China’s 
banking system, as well as the economic development during the last twenty years 
had a strong influence on the operation of transmission mechanism. Despite a much 
more liberalized access to various sources of outside finance that are increasingly 
market-driven, like FDI or issuing shares or bonds, bank loans remain an important 
source of outside finance. Based on the literature review, an interactive approach and 
a new paradigm are introduced. 
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The fourth and fifth chapters introduce the data sets that are used throughout the 
empirical analysis. Moreover, we underscore the importance of distinguishing 
causalities between different variables in the bank lending channel, which is 
necessary for an in-depth assessment of affiliations inside the interactive bank 
lending channel. In addition, sensitivity analyses of the institutional changes are at 
the last sub-section of these two chapters, to test how the government interventions 
have impacts on bank lending channel. 
 
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes the analysis with some remarks concerning the 
bank lending channel and policy implications in China. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Reviews 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The monetary transmissions mechanism is important as the center of the monetary 
economics. Imperfections of the monetary transmission mechanism and 
developments of financial institutions cause the literatures and research to evolve 
from time to time. Banks remain the dominant source of intermediated credit in 
China; yet to be specialized in overcoming information problems in credit markets. It 
is necessary to take an overview about how literatures have interpreted the credit 
view of monetary transmission mechanism, which section 2.2 will provide. 
Investment is generally accepted as one of the important elements in the lending 
channel. Hence, in Section 2.3, the focus shifts to describe the investment activities 
and discuss the question whether different types of investment have the same impact 
in the channel. Finally, Section 2.4 provides a conclusion to this chapter.  
 
2.2 What do people say about the transmissions mechanism in credit 
view? 
The pillar of the monetary transmission mechanism oversees the monetary policy 
transmitted into real income in the economy. Let’s take a glimpse as to what evidence 
literatures give to the existence of the bank lending channel. 
 
B S Bernanke and A S Blinder are two well-known founders of the building block of 
the credit view. Bernanke (1983) first renewed the research interests in 
intermediations by directing attention to cyclical changes in bank lending. Bernanke 
and Lown (1991) suggested that if alternative forms of credit are not easily 
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substitutable with bank loans, then the economic effect of a fall in bank lending, both 
directly to small borrowers and indirectly to the macro economy as a whole, might be 
significant. It is consistent with the findings of Bernanke (1992) that banks and other 
lenders sometimes ration credits. All that is required for a credit channel is that bank 
credits and other forms of credits are imperfect substitutes for borrowers. Thus the 
fact that many bank borrowers have potential alternative credit sources does not 
eliminate the credit channel, as long as the alternative credit sources are to some 
extent more expensive or less convenient to the borrower.  
 
Bernanke (1993) made further contributions to the lending view. He stressed that 
borrowers who do not have good alternatives to banks credits reduce aggregate 
spending when the central bank reduces the monetary base. The reduction in loans is 
a supplement to the monetary response. Bank loans decline with deposits or money, 
as in the traditional monetarist transmission process. In addition, borrowers with 
restricted alternatives respond disproportionately to a monetary shock.  
 
There are also works done on this issue by other economists such as Benjamin 
Friedman (1983); Friedman and Kuttner (1993) have done extensive work on the 
effects of changes in credits or financial markets on portfolio allocation. Meltzer 
(1995) compared the monetarist and lending models and presented evidence on the 
importance of the lending channel. He described that credit and intermediation have 
long been analyzed as part of the transmission process.  
 
Romer and Romer (1994) provided reduced-form model estimates by showing that 
there is a large negative effect of changes in the federal fund rate on real GDP. Their 
regression output shows that the effect is highly significant in postwar U.S. data. On 
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the other hand, many econometric models based on the Jorgenson approach 
(Jorgenson, 1963; Meltzer, 1995) have found negative interest rate effects on 
investment. For example, Taylor (1993) found that fixed investment is significantly 
related to the real interest rate in the United States by using the multi-country model. 
He found that fixed investment is negatively related to the real interest rate in all of 
the G-7 countries. Again, Taylor (1995) estimated an empirical model of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in the G-7 countries of United States, Canada, 
Germany, France, Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom to answer the question why 
investment remained so strong despite the rise in interest rates.  
 
Since Taylor (1995) has asserted that the monetary transmission mechanism in other 
nations causes investment, and investment is now the so-called essence of Chinese 
economic development, further discussion of different types of investment on the 
economy will be given at Section 2.3. 
 
However, recent research by Perez (1998) employed a quarterly data model for the 
United States to give evidence that the availability of commercial and industrial loans 
does not cause aggregate output, which creates doubts in the bank lending channel 
that appears no longer to be important.  
 
Since the literatures and empirical works are concentrated on the U.S. and other 
developed economies, it is one of the reasons that this study investigates the credit 
channel of China as a developing country. We also discuss how certain parts of the 
credit channel model are modified to test the mechanism of the lending channel in 
China. 
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In fact, most of the empirical studies apply a two-fold examination of this 
mechanism. First, they test it by using aggregate time-series data. Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) put forth the idea that one of the most influential of this type of studies is 
Bernanke’s (1983) examination of the Great Depression in the United States. In 
addition, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) used time-series data to estimate a structural 
vector autoregressive model. They found that shocks on loans supply have 
significant real effects. Another example is demonstrated by Kashyap, Stein and 
Wilcox (1993) who successfully gained insight about the commercial papers as 
substitutions for bank loans. However, Kashyap and Stein (1994) pointed out that 
aggregate time-series data provide relatively few episodes where monetary policy 
shifts and how it affects the lending channel. Li (2002c) who uses time series data of 
China from 1952 to 1999, finds that there is a Granger causality from economic 
growth to financial intermediation, and its reverse causality. However, there is no 
causality among the other elements included in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Knowing that limitations are associated with the time-series analysis, 
this study will start with a quarterly time-series model and be followed by a panel 
data model for China. 
 
Secondly, there are tests using cross-sectional data. Here data are more difficult to 
collect, organize and quantify, as the micro-firm level data is not easy to obtain. 
However the result of such kind of testing is promising. A good example is the 
empirical works by Gertler and Gilchrist (1992) who use a survey of over seven 
thousand manufacturing firms to compare and contrast the lending behavior of small 
and large firms under the monetary contraction. Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) make 
use of the same sort of data in their subsequent work to comment on Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1992). Kashyap and Stein (2000) provide an improved test of the lending 
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channel, which has examined in more detail how the monetary policy affects the 
lending behavior of individual banks, as opposed to broadly aggregated measures of 
lending. Although the research methods of these cross-sectional works have 
advantages, the constraint to our research is the unavailability of firm level data of 
China with bank loans which hinders the feasibility of such tests. To overcome this 
problem, this study uses panel data at the provincial level. 
 
2.3 Investment Activities 
The credit view emphasizes that banks are important because they produce 
information in funding specialized investment. The importance of investment is to 
create aggregate demand and to improve economic infrastructures in China (Chow 
1993; Sun 1998) Hence, the bank lending channel plays an essential role for the 
connection between bank loans and investment and for the connection between 
investment and aggregate output.  
 
Ownership and source of capital inputs divide aggregate investment into different 
forms of investments. It is widely acknowledged that foreign direct investment is a 
key factor for the economic growth in China since her liberalization of economic 
structure in 1978 (Tsang and Ma, 1997; Tsang and Ma, 2000). It should be noted that 
the overwhelming foreign investment could also bring benefits as well as the 
undesirable backlashes: competition is pressure on, and therefore there is a survival 
problem of domestic enterprises (Ma, 2001b).  
 
On the micro level, Driffield and Hughes (2002) employ panel data in the industry 
level to test whether domestic investment is crowded out by foreign direct 
investment in the UK. They found that domestic investment can be stimulated by 
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FDI, yet in some regions, foreign direct investment has crowded out domestic 
investment. On the macro level, Harrison and McMillan (2003) have done a research 
by using firm level data from the Ivory Coast to test whether domestic firms are more 
credit constrained than foreign firms. In addition, they examine borrowings by 
foreign firms to see whether they aggravate the credit constraints of local firms. The 
results suggest that foreign direct investment does have a negative effect on domestic 
investment in the aspects of bank lending. 
 
However, we believe that the effects of foreign direct investment on domestic 
investment should be varied across nations. In fact, Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee 
(1998) investigated in a cross-country regression to see whether the inflow of foreign 
capital would crowd out domestic investment. They found an opposite result: a 
strong “crowding-in” effect of foreign investment on domestic investment.  
 
The assumption of bank lending channel is that monetary policy can affect the 
aggregate investment which in turn has impact on the real income of an economy. 
Nonetheless, we relax this assumption and decompose the aggregate investment into 
domestic investment and foreign direct investment. For the case of China, Sun, Tong 
and Yu (2002) has studied the panel OLS regression model for the determinant 
factors of foreign direct investment across China. They found that the cumulative 
foreign direct investment relative to cumulative domestic investment has a negative 
impact on the new FDI. In this research, apart from explanation of the mechanism of 
bank lending channel of China, it is also of great interest to find out whether there is 
a crowding-out effect (i.e. substitution effect) or a crowding-in effect (i.e. 
complementary effect) between domestic investment and foreign direct investment 
across different provinces and metropolises. We will apply the Granger causality test 
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to test this by using both national level time-series vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models and provincial level panel VAR models. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a brief literature review of the credit view of monetary 
transmission, especially the highlights of the bank lending channel. We provided 
detailed discussions of existing empirical works which concentrate on the bank 
lending channel. A lot of effort was put into studying the western economies but not 
the Chinese economy. On the other hand, the chapter brings out the issue of 
investment in regard to the bank lending channel. We also reviewed the literatures 
that examined the relationship between domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment. Inspired by these literatures, the next chapter will provide a new 
analytical framework to explain the bank lending channel of China.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Elaborations have been delivered to the literatures that have addressed the issue of 
the monetary transmission mechanism in the previous chapter. Our research 
framework will be discussed in this chapter in detail. 
 
From the discussions of the previous chapter, considerable literatures have tried to 
explain the practicability, validity and feasibility of monetary transmission 
mechanism in the economy. Up to now, most studies basically concentrate on the 
situation and experiences in the United States economy. It seems that the traditional 
bank lending channel has some difficulties in interpreting two historic time periods 
in the United States: the Great Depression of the 1930s and what Bernanke and 
Lown (1991) called the “credit crunch” of the early 1990s.  
 
Therefore, there are some doubts as to whether the traditional bank lending channel 
can successfully explain the whole monetary mechanism. However, subsequent 
researches modified the theory or tested it in other economies. For example, Taylor 
(1995) employed an empirical model to examine the monetary transmission 
mechanism in G-7 countries. The result is promising in that the shifts of monetary 
policy can stimulate aggregate output (real GDP).  
 
China, a rising economic power, has experienced a great leap in economic reform 
and now is trying to catch up to the pace of the economic development of its Western 
counterparts. There is no research by which to apply the concept of Granger causality 
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to examine the bank lending channel in China. The focus of this research is to 
investigate the relationship of the banking sector and the Chinese economy from the 
bank lending channel based on the credit view of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. It also examines the impact of banking sectors on the Chinese economy.  
 
The structure of the remaining part of this chapter is as follows: the review of the 
traditional framework of the monetary transmission mechanism is given in Section 
3.2 and the designated paradigm and methodologies will be discussed in Section 3.3 
followed by a the conclusion. 
 
3.2 Traditional Framework 
Economists, monetarists and policy makers have debated for a long time about the 
effects of monetary policy on economic activity. To summarize their arguments, it is 
necessary to understand the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the 
economy. 
 
Mishkin (2003) described two basic evidences: structural model evidence and 
reduced-form evidence. 
 
“Keynesians typically examine the effect of money on economic activity 
by building a structural model, a description of how the economy 
operates using a collection of equations that describe the behavior of 
firms and consumers in many sectors of the economy. These equations 
then show the channels through which monetary and fiscal policy affect 
aggregate output spending” 
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A Keynesian structural model might have behavioral equations that describe the 
workings of monetary policy with the following systematic and schematic Figure 3.1. 
The Keynesians examine the channel between money supply and aggregate spending 
by studying how the link between interest rates and investment influences the 
economy. The model describes the transmission mechanism of monetary policy as 
follows: The money supply M affects interest rates i, which in turn affects investment 




Figure 3.1 The transmission mechanism of Keynesian structural model. 
 
Unlike the Keynesians, Monetarists examine the monetary effects by using 
reduced-form models, as the economy was supposed to work in a black box in which 
operations cannot be clearly seen. Therefore there is no structural restriction imposed 
on how monetary policy affects the economy. In regards to the interest-rate channel 
in the transmission mechanisms, continuous disagreements and dissatisfactions have 
driven the monetary research into two directions: other asset price effects and the 
credit view. 
 
Credit view has five channels in the mechanism. Figure 3.3 provides a general view 
on all transmission channels of credit view. Balance-sheet channel refers to the fact 
that the expansionary monetary policy will cause a rise in the equity prices. Thus, 
due to reduction in adverse selection and moral hazard problems, lending activity, 
M i            I Y
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investment and aggregate demand will be increased.  
 
Another channel that works similar to the balance-sheet channel is called the cash 
flow channel. Like the previous channel, it starts with expansionary monetary policy, 
which decreases the nominal interest rate and increases the amount of flowing cash 
in hand, the results that followed, therefore, are the same as the balance-sheet 
channel. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems become less severe, leading to 
an increase in lending and aggregate output. 
 
The unanticipated price level channel has suggests that expansionary monetary 
policy leads to an unanticipated increase in the price level which raises real net worth, 
that decreases the possibility of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
thereby causing a rise in investment spending and aggregate output. 
 
Apart from issues concerning the business spending, there is a channel focus on 
consumer spending, namely, the household liquidity effects. Mishkin (1977) has 
claimed that the likelihood of suffering from financial distress of consumers will lead 
to other mechanisms for monetary policy, operating through the link between money 
and equity prices. “When consumers have a large amount of financial assets relative 
to their debts, their estimate of the probability of financial distress is low, and they 
will be more willing to purchase consumer durables or housing.” When stock prices 
rise, the value of financial assets rises as well, thus increasing consumption and 
hence aggregate output. 
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Figure 3.2 Theoretical operation of the bank lending channel 
 
In contrast to the traditional Keynesian transmission mechanism that operates strictly 
through interest rates, the credit view holds that a bank lending channel allows 
central bank actions to affect the supply of loans from depository institutions 
(‘banks’), which in turn, affect the real spending of bank borrowers. Increases in 
bank deposits result in an expansionary monetary policy, which enables the quantity 
of bank loans to be increased. In other words, access to obtaining bank loans will 
cause investment and consumer spending. Figure 3.2 is a graphic explanation of how 
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Figure 3.3 The link between monetary policy and GDP: Monetary Transmission Mechanisms in Credit View 
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3.3 An analytical paradigm 
Just as in the bank lending channel shown in Figure 3.2, there is a clear mechanism 
for how the monetary policy transmits into the macroeconomic performance through 
some intermediate factors. Nevertheless, we try to expand such a one-way causality 
mechanism depicted in Figure 3.2 to a multi-direction causality mechanism in Figure 
3.4. This implies that economic activities and monetary policies have both direct and 
indirect dynamic interactions with each other. 
 
Figure 3.4 Paradigm of the causalities of bank-lending channel 
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bank lending channel by ignoring the bank deposits, as bank loans can reflect the 
amount of the deposits. Hence there are total five key factors to be examined in this 
channel. They are respectively interest rate (monetary policy), bank loans, 
investment, Gross Domestic Product (economic activity) and inflation performance 
(economic performance). 
 
In Figure 3.4, the arrows inside the cycle represent the direct causality of each pair of 
factors. Next we will discuss the interactions of the five factors in the bank lending 
transmission mechanism based on the paradigm in Figure 3.4. 
 
A Interest Rate Policy 
To begin with, the condition of the monetary policy will affect the capacity of bank 
loans with a negative causality (see Bernanke (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995)). For instance, a decrease in nominal interest rate will increase the capacity of 
bank loans. Investment is affected by the monetary policy as the interest rate is the 
crucial indicator of the atmosphere of the investment. It is expected that a negative 
impact in this pair of causality (Taylor, 1995). He has addressed there will be a fact 
that economic activity and economic performance are highly related to monetary 
policy in a negative way. An increase in interest rate reduces people’s incentives to 
consume, which in turn affects GDP (in expenditure approach). Similarly, an upward 
shift of interest rate can contain inflation, therefore the interest rate is negatively 
related to inflation. 
 
B Bank Loans 
An increase in the amount of bank loans leads to an increase in investment and 
therefore a positive causality is expected among them. Besides, Bernanke and 
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Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) Mishkin (1995) pointed out that 
underlying loans are positively related to economic output according to the 
Keynesian theory. There is a positive relation between bank loans and inflation rate. 
As bank lending can achieve positive growth in investment and economic output, 
hence in turn it causes inflation. Consequently, the central bank will raise interest 
rates to control the inflation rate. Hence bank loans are positively related to the 
interest rate.  
 
C Investment 
Positive causalities are expected from investment to both GDP and inflation. 
Investment is one of the crucial factors that contributes to GDP. An increase of 
investment will therefore also generate inflation pressure. Monetary policy will then 
act as an instrument to promptly confine the overheated economy (Bernanke (1992), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). A positive sign is therefore expected from investment 
to interest rate  
 
It is also widely accepted that an increase in investment will follow from an increase 
in GDP since investment requires credits from banks for capital inputs. Hence the 
increase of the number of potential investment projects will cause a higher incentive 
for the demand of loans (cf. Sub-section 3.3), as the bank would like to seek potential 
partners for bank lending. 
 
D Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Gross Domestic Product is an important indicator of economic activity. Bernanke 
(1992) believes that strong economic growth may lead to a higher demand for credit 
to finance spending decisions, thus economic activity positively affects bank loans 
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(cf. Sub-section 3.3 B for the reverse causality from credit to GDP). This is the main 
idea of the credit view that regards loans as the third asset besides money and bonds. 
Banks loans can generate real GDP too.  
 
Aggregate output is an indicator of the necessity of adjustment of monetary policy 
(cf. Sub-section 3.3 A). When the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product of an 
economy is believed to be to fast, it may accelerate the inflation. The central bank 
will set a brake on it by increasing the interest rate. Hence the GDP affects the 
interest rate positively. 
 
An increase in aggregate output will increase the demand for investment, because 
potential investors favor a strong economic performance on aggregate spending.   
 
E Inflation Performance 
Inflation rate is one of the important indicators of the economic performance. 
Inflation rate has a direct impact on monetary policy if the central bank intends to 
stabilize the inflation rate as a target. (Please refer to Sub-section 3.3 A) A positive 
relationship between inflation and bank loans is expected. A rise in inflation will lead 
to a fall in the real cost of loans thereby creating an incentive for households and 
firms to have a demand for more loans (cf. Sub-section 3.3 B). 
 
Howells and Hussein (1999) argued that if bank lending rates are somewhat sticky 
relative to changes in prices, it is still expected that inflation has a negative impact on 
investment. The rise in inflation is associated with large variability of the inflation 
rate; this may generate uncertainty about the future return on investments and 
discourage firms from undertaking investments (cf. Sub-section 3.3 C). Like the 
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aggregate output, the inflation rate is another indicator of confidence level for 
investment. It is because an increase in inflation does worsen the business 
environment, which defies the investors. 
 
Expectation of negative effect of inflation rate on aggregate output (cf. Sub-section 
3.3 D) was reinforced by Mankiw (1995) which points out that though economic 
growth positively leads to a rise of inflation, conversely, inflation hinders the 
aggregate output. 
 
Having discussed the theoretical relations in Figure 3.4, we now discuss the 
empirical test of them. Empirical work on the existence of a bank lending channel 
generally has focused on the correlations among aggregate output, bank debt, and 
indicators of monetary policy. Perez (1995) suggested that correlations do not 
necessarily imply causality. The fact that the movement of one variable is linked to 
another does not necessarily mean that one variable causes the other. 
 
As such, we have two main foci in this research of the transmission mechanism. 
Firstly, it is the causality of loans and aggregate output. The links of loans and 
aggregate output have been shown in Figure 3.5 below: how loans affect the 
aggregate output. 
 
Loans      Investment      GDP 
 
Figure 3.5 Linkage of the causality loans and aggregate output. 
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We expected there should be positive two-way causalities between loans and 
investment and between investment and aggregate output.  
 
However, a negative influence may arise from investment affecting loans. Because 
investment can be through another channel of financing: the foreign direct 
investment. Therefore, the second focus of this research is about the investment 
source. We will investigate two types of investments to consider their causality to the 
economic activity. Figure 3.6 shows the whole picture of the investment mechanism. 
There will be two possibilities. One is a negative effect in the causality between 
domestic investment and foreign direct investment if the crowding out effect 
occurred. Another is the complementary effect, therefore, a positive sign should be 
expected in the causality. 
 
 




             
 
Figure 3.6 Expanded mechanism of investment in relationships to the bank lending 
channel 
 
As China’s economy becomes increasingly market oriented and sophisticated, some 
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expected. Hence, a vector autoregressive (VAR) time series model and its panel 
counterpart will be employed as instruments to test the causalities of each pair of the 
key factors. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Considerable research has explored the role played by bank lending in the 
transmission of monetary shocks. Keynesian structural model emphasize on the 
behavior of the monetary policy which affects aggregate output and investment. 
Notwithstanding the rapid changes of the economic environment in recent decades  
doubts and contradictions are raised concerning the validity of the Keynesian model 
in the modern world. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), based 
on reduced-form models, claimed that in recent years there has been a great deal of 
work on developing monetary models and there has also been substantial progress in 
constructing empirical measures of the transmission mechanism. 
 
Along with new development of monetary economics, we are focusing on the bank 
lending transmission channel which is expanded from the credit-view theory. The 
focus is how the economy generates output through credit activities. Therefore, 
financial intermediators such as banks are important for our study. In the research 
paradigm, we have focused on how bank loans affect economic output. We include 
both domestic investment and foreign domestic investment as two important 
economic activities. These two investment activities might interact with each other to 
have either a crowding out effect or a complementary effect. The causality test to be 
implemented in this research will try to identify these effects.   
 
In the remaining part of the thesis, Chapter 4 will apply the vector autoregressive 
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(VAR) model as a tool to investigate the aggregate effect of bank lending channel on 
quarterly time series model for China. The regional impacts will be examined by an 
unbalanced panel VAR model in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 Aggregate Time Series Model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework was built to analyze the credit view 
of the bank lending channel. In this chapter, we apply the aggregate time series 
model to conduct the empirical study for China. 
 
There is considerable empirical research to explore the bank lending channel. 
Benanke and Blinder (1988 and 1992), Romer and Romer (1990) and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) have provided extensive literature review (cf. Chapter 2 for a detailed 
discussion). Recently, Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003) studied the behavior of 
euro aggregate loans to the private sector. In our study, we will follow their approach 
to model the bank lending channel by using aggregate Chinese quarterly data over 
the recent nine years.  
 
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 gives the 
detailed procedure of how to apply the time series model to conduct the Granger 
causality tests, Section 4.3, reports the results and analyzes the main findings, 
Section 4.4 presents concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
Basically, the time series model is a common and comprehensible approach to for 
studying the monetary transmission mechanism. For western economies, there are 
already enormous literatures which have studied the monetary transmission 
mechanism in OECD countries. In this section, we employ the method of the time 
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series model utilized by Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003) to study the case of 
China. We now commence with the data description and derivation of the model. 
 
4.2.1 Data Description 
The China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Centre offers two 
sources that provide our data: China Monthly Statistics (CMS) and China e-monthly 
Statistics (CEMS), with coverage from 1994 to 2003. Subject to the availability of 
the data, quarterly data was adopted for the following variables: the aggregate output 
(GDP), value-added of industrial sector (VA), loans (including total loans, industrial 
short term loans and total industrial loans1) in national banking systems and other 
banks in China2. For the missing value during the sample period, complements of 
the data are from the CEIC Asian Dataset of China. The lending rate of working 
capital for 1 year and of capital construction for less than 3 years are collected from 
the Datastream, which represent the short and long run interest rates, respectively. 
 
Base year of the constant price has been chosen as 1995. All the variables except 
interest rate must be deflated by the deflator p to obtain the real time series. The 
symbol p stands for the deflator. There are two deflators in this study. They are 
respectively, the GDP deflator and value-added deflator, which are calculated as the 
ratio of current market price series over the constant price series. All the time series 
are plotted in Fig 4.1. The GDP deflator has sharp fluctuations from the mid 1994 to 
1996Q1, then it remains quite steady towards 2003 [cf. Figure 4.1 (b)]. Interestingly, 
                                                 
1 Total industrial loans are approximated as total loans times industrial short term loans over total 
short term loans 
2 Before 1995, due to the availability of data, there is no classification of National Banking system 
and Other Banks by CMS, therefore the figure is from the statistical information of the state owned 
banks 
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the value-added deflator has a U-shaped graph showing that it fell to the bottom in 
1999. Inflation rate, π, is calculated as △p*4 – the annualized inflation rate. From 
Figure 4.1, we can see that the trend of the two inflation rates based on the GDP 
deflator and value-added deflator are rather similar. 
 
Increasing trends of real GDP, real value-added of industrial sector, total loans and 
total industrial loans provided evidence of rapid growth in Chinese economy, with 
exception of industrial loans which have slowed down gradually after 1999. Though 
domestic investment and foreign direct investment have been deflated by two 
different deflators, all of these four variables have strong upward trends in Figure 
4.1b. 
 
Interest rates are regulated by the People’s Bank of China that leads to the 
downward shapes for both interest rates of working capital 1 year and of capital 
construction less than 3 years. 
 
Real GDP, real value-added, all bank loans and, all real investments have taken the 
natural logarithm. All variables except interest rates have been subject to the X-11 
seasonal adjustment3. Table 4.1 provides a brief review of statistical information of 
all variables.
                                                 
3 X-11 is the quarterly seasonal adjustment program adopted by the United Sates Bureau of the 
Census & Statistical Research Division 
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Table 4.1a Descriptive statistics of quarterly time series 
Sample: 1994:1 2003:3 
 YGDP YVA LOANSttl LOANSstindustrial LOANSttlindustrial i(working capital 1 yr) i(capital construction less 
than 3 yrs) 
πGDP 
 Mean  7.552082  6.471497  8.715258  7.387688  7.825030  7.970000  8.589231 -0.011685 
 Median  7.631466  6.491703  8.895450  7.647176  8.063598  6.390000  6.660000 -0.004631 
 Maximum  7.945290  7.009233  9.428653  7.780721  8.427605  12.06000  13.50000  0.317032 
 Minimum  6.647772  5.938381  7.791130  6.435085  6.854890  5.310000  5.490000 -0.496494 
 Std. Dev.  0.302426  0.299198  0.477237  0.437421  0.494041  2.590054  3.112614  0.166907 
 Skewness -1.108111 -0.000756 -0.484435 -1.024790 -0.689420  0.387845  0.397442 -0.874656 
 Kurtosis  3.907850  2.005878  2.011776  2.468706  2.071620  1.423179  1.438097  4.562363 
         
 Jarque-Bera  9.320725  1.605955  3.112354  7.098161  4.374887  5.018096  4.990995  8.939237 
 Probability  0.009463  0.447993  0.210941  0.028751  0.112203  0.081346  0.082455  0.011452 
         
 Sum  294.5312  252.3884  339.8951  280.7322  297.3511  310.8300  334.9800 -0.455703 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.475535  3.401746  8.654679  7.079489  9.030843  254.9184  368.1579  1.058601 
         
 Observations  39  39  39  38  38  39  39  39 
 
  Missing Data:              1994Q1     1994Q1 
Note: For definitions of the variables, see Appendix 
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Table 4.1b Descriptive statistics of quarterly time series 
 
Sample: 1994:1 2003:3 
 πVA ID, GDP ID, VA FDIGDP FDIVA GDPDEFLATOR VADEFLATOR TIME 
 Mean -0.012855  6.134363  6.320239  4.500862  4.681285  1.024895  0.863043  19.00000 
 Median -0.014676  6.169845  6.429682  4.506922  4.700999  1.006068  0.834418  19.00000 
 Maximum  0.364964  6.964793  7.073197  5.005306  5.143843  1.203490  1.062901  38.00000 
 Min imum -0.555012  5.347888  5.448467  4.158996  4.262739  0.945368  0.741697  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.155350  0.421247  0.451764  0.176164  0.195795  0.062380  0.095265  11.40175 
 Skewness -0.706942  0.084618 -0.246980  0.587498 -0.386382  1.359244  0.631875  0.000000 
 Kurtosis  5.906863  2.352515  2.144885  3.735724  3.282382  4.126757  2.226743  1.798421 
         
 Jarque-Bera  16.10875  0.671816  1.462828  2.882856  1.015356  14.07211  3.475406  2.346162 
 Probability  0.000318  0.714689  0.481228  0.236590  0.601892  0.000880  0.175924  0.309412 
         
 Sum -0.475638  220.8371  227.5286  162.0310  168.5263  39.97090  32.79563  741.0000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.868814  6.210703  7.143175  1.086184  1.341751  0.147869  0.335790  4940.000 
         
 Observations  37  36  36  36  36  39  38  39 
 
 
  Missing Data:       1994Q1 to Q2  1994Q1 toQ3 1994Q1 toQ3 1994Q1 toQ3 1994Q1 toQ3     1994Q1
  Chapter 4 
 33










94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03









94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03









94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03










94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03











94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
In flation  rate of G D P  deflator
  Chapter 4 
 34







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03








94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03







94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03




















94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03






94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
T im e Trend
  Chapter 4 
 35
4.2.2 The Model 
According to literatures and previous theoretical work on the bank lending channel 
(cf. Chapter 3), the determinants of the loans issued by the banking sector in China to 
the economy can be modeled as a function of lending rate, inflation rate, domestic 
investment and foreign direct investment. The basic model is specified in the 
log-linear form: 
 
Yt = f( loanst , it , πt ) + εt       (1) 
 
where f(.) is the functional form, Y and loans denote logs of real GDP and real value 
of the loans.The nominal interest rate is represented by i and π stands for the 
annualized inflation rate4. The error term is εt . 
 
To consider the impacts of investments (domestic investment ID and foreign ones 
FDI) in the process of bank lending channel, equation (1) is expanded as the 
following: 
 
Yt = f( loanst , it , πt , ID t , FDIt ) +εt    (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are just two examples of the whole banking-lending channel 
mechanism, which actually is estimated by the time series Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model. Define Zt = (loanst, Yt, it, πt), or Zt =  (loanst, Yt, it, πt, IDt, FDIt). 
                                                 
4 Adopting the method used by Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003), π should refer to the rate of 
expected inflation in principle. But since inflation expectations are not directly observable and there 
are several difficulties in their estimation, the conventional approach in the empirical work consists of 
taking contemporaneous inflation as a proxy (implicitly relying on the assumption that expectations 
are- on average- in line with the outcomes). 
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The VAR equations are expressed as follows: 
 
VAR (q):   Zt = β0+β1Zt-1+β2Zt-2+…βqZt-q+εt   (3) 
 
The number of lags (q) in each VAR is set to minimize the value of Schwarz Criteria 
as Table 4.2 shows. To avoid the pre-test bias that may arise from the integration and 
cointegration tests on the time series vector Zt, we apply the surplus lag estimation 
(Lukepohl and Burda, 1997) to test the Granger causality from one variable to 
another. That is, we estimate a VAR with q+1 lag and then only apply the Wald test 
on the coefficients of the variables with lags up to q to conduct the Granger causality 
test. 
 
VAR (q+1):  Zt = β0+β1Zt-1+β2Zt-2+…βqZt-q+βq+1Zt-(q+1)+εt  (4) 
 
Based on the availability of data, variables are grouped in 20 different vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models. Table 4.3 has listed the summary of different 
combination of the variables in each named VAR. 
 
We now take VAR 5 as an example to demonstrate how to obtain the result of each 
pairs of causality (see Statistic Appendix in this chapter).  
 
First of all, it is required to consider the Schwarz Criteria in every vector 
autoregression with different lags (see, for example, Table 4.9 for lag 3) to find the 
optimal lags (q) (see summary results in Table 4.10). The optimal lag q is in 3 with a 
minimized Schwarz Criteria -5.279003.  
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Table 4.2 Summary of Schwarz Criteria in VARs. 
VAR code 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 4 Lags 5 Lags 
VAR 1 -5.15 † -4.9 -4.2 -4.47 -3.35 
VAR 2 -4.36 † -4.2 -4.02 -4.29 3.35E-3 
VAR 3 -8.69 † -5.9 -3.26 -5.52 NA 
VAR 4 -7.88 † -5.02 -2.55 -5.64 NA 
VAR 5 -4.84 -5.01 -5.28 † -4.68 -3.56 
VAR 6 -3.97 -4.24 -4.98 † -4.43 -3.36 
VAR 7 -8.62 † -5.84 -4.63 -6.52 NA 
VAR 8 -7.78 † -4.97 -4.08 -5.03 NA 
VAR 9 -7.9 † -6.83 -5.27 -4.34 -2.57 
VAR 10 -9.39 † -6.54 -4.25 -2.84 NA 
VAR 11 -8.29 † -7.03 -5.4 -4.03 -2.19 
VAR 12 -8.06 † -6.51 -5.15 -3.41 -1.35 
VAR 13 -9.84 † -6.84 -3.82 -1.2 NA 
VAR 14 -9.58 † -6.51 -3.64 -0.25 NA 
VAR 15 -7.64 † -6.43 -4.69 -3.72 -1.94 
VAR 16 -8.89 † -5.93 -3.43 -2.25 NA 
VAR 17 -8.03 † -6.64 -4.86 -3.39 -1.59 
VAR 18 -7.74 † -6.33 -4.68 -2.8 -0.82 
VAR 19 -9.24 † -6.17 -3 -0.63 NA 
VAR 20 -9.02 † -6 -2.87 0.36 NA 
Note: † denotes optimal lag for the VAR. for definitions of each VAR, see Table 4.3. 
 
According to Lukepohl and Burda (1997), lags (q+1) will be adopted to conduct the 
Granger causality tests based on system estimation of VAR. The system estimation is 
therefore based on 4 lags (Table 4.11). The advantage of the system estimation is its 
efficiency in estimating the parameters. 
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Name of the VAR Economics Output Bank Loans Monetary Policy Economic Performance Investment Investment Time Trend
VAR1 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (GDP Deflator)
VAR2 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (GDP Deflator)
VAR3 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (GDP Deflator) ID deflated by GDP delfator FDI deflated by GDP deflator
VAR4 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (GDP Deflator) ID deflated by GDP delfator FDI deflated by GDP deflator
VAR5 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (GDP Deflator) TIME
VAR6 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (GDP Deflator) TIME
VAR7 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (GDP Deflator) ID deflated by GDP delfator FDI deflated by GDP deflator TIME
VAR8 YGDP LOANSttl i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (GDP Deflator) ID deflated by GDP delfator FDI deflated by GDP deflator TIME
VAR9 YVA LOANSstindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator)
VAR10 YVA LOANSstindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator
VAR11 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator)
VAR12 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (Value Added Deflator)
VAR13 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator
VAR14 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator
VAR15 YVA LOANSstindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) TIME
VAR16 YVA LOANSstindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator TIME
VAR17 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) TIME
VAR18 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) TIME
VAR19 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Working Capital 1 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator TIME
VAR20 YVA LOANSttlindustrial i  (Capital Construction less than 3 yr) π (Value Added Deflator) ID deflated by Value Added delfator FDI deflated by Value added deflator TIME
Table 4.3 Selected Variables of the linkage of Bank Lending Channel in each Vector Autoregression
 Note: For definitions of the variables, see Appendix 
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Finally, based on the system estimation of VAR 5 with 4 lags, we apply the Wald test 
in Table 4.4 to test the hypothesis of no Granger causality, i.e., that all parameters of 
the variables of first 3 lags are zeros. The Wald test provides the p-value from the 
chi-squared distribution. If the p-value is below, say, 5% (0.05), then the hypothesis 
is rejected and Granger causality is found. In addition, the sum of the coefficients of 
the first 3 lags is also presented, which provide the long-run effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
Surprisingly, results from the various VARs have shown a weak causality in the bank 
lending channel (Table 4.4). The results somehow cannot even give evidence to 
support the traditional view of the monetary transmission mechanism. There may be 
no direct causality but there exists indirect causality among variables in the proposed 
bank lending channel explained in Chapter 3.  
 
4.3.1 The Causality between bank loans and economic output  
Figure 4.2 provides a clear picture how bank lending channel works from the 
estimated model. It shows the significant direct and indirect causalities within the 
channel. There is no direct causality from bank loans to real GDP. This is probably 
due to the fact that the power of the time series model is relatively weak. We will try 
to examine this pair of causality by using a panel model in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.4 Causality Test of VAR 5 
 
Wald Test     
System Estimation: VAR5         
Chi squared Sum of 
Null Hypothesis: statistic Probability Conclusion Coefficients 
For equation YGDP:     
Coefficients of LOANSttl (-1) to LOANSttl (-3) are all zeros 2.69711 0.440719 LOANSttl ≠>YGDP 0.108883 
Coefficients of i (-1) to i (-3) are all zeros 2.375429 0.498225 i ≠>YGDP 0.022229 
Coefficients of π (-1) to π (-3) are all zeros 9.293084 0.025638** π ＝> YGDP -0.38769 
For equation LOANSttl:     
Coefficients of YGDP (-1) to YGDP (-3) are all zeros 7.77649 0.050864** YGDP ＝> LOANSttl -0.72473 
Coefficients of i (-1) to i (-3) are all zeros 6.232434 0.100833* i ＝>LOANSttl -0.02317 
Coefficients of π (-1) to π (-3) are all zeros 5.724646 0.125803 π ≠> LOANSttl -0.15023 
For equation i:     
Coefficients of YGDP (-1) to YGDP (-3) are all zeros 11.026694 0.010367*** YGDP ＝> i 5.669402 
Coefficients of LOANSttl (-1) to LOANSttl (-3) are all zeros 8.01345 0.045735** LOANSttl ＝> i -2.27337 
Coefficients of π (-1) to π (-3) are all zeros 12.63435 0.005498*** π ＝> i 2.236776 
For equation π:     
Coefficients of YGDP (-1) to YGDP (-3) are all zeros 7.532479 0.05673* YGDP ＝> π 3.029775 
Coefficients of LOANSttl (-1) to LOANSttl (-3) are all zeros 2.007328 0.570887 LOANSttl ≠> π -0.52809 
Coefficients of i (-1) to i (-3) are all zeros 6.909065 0.074853* i ＝> π 0.147483 
Notes: ≠> means no Granger Causality. 
＝> means there is Granger Causality. 
***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
Probability of χ2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom  
 
  Chapter 4 
 50
 [ 9.08947] [ 0.38950] [ 4.12192] [-0.24937] 
TIME 0.014331 0.010363 0.063053 -0.022653 
 [ 6.93574] [ 2.69052] [ 2.03626] [-1.55602] 
          
 R-squared 0.994221 0.994606 0.990392 0.541839 
 Adj. R-squared 0.990806 0.991418 0.984715 0.271107 
 Sum sq. resids 0.009646 0.033515 2.166324 0.478851 
 S.E. equation 0.02094 0.039031 0.313798 0.147533 
 F-statistic 291.1406 312.0335 174.4447 2.001386 
 Log likelihood 96.96284 74.54523 -0.493017 26.67614 
 Akaike AIC -4.609047 -3.363624 0.805168 -0.70423 
 Schwarz SC -3.993234 -2.747811 1.420981 -0.088417 
 Mean dependent 7.613428 8.787393 7.719167 -0.007743 
 S.D. dependent 0.218382 0.421329 2.538127 0.172805 
          
 Determinant Residual Covariance 2.27E-10   
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 195.3606   
 Akaike Information Criteria -7.742255   
 Schwarz Criteria -5.279003     
 
Table 4.10 Summary of Schwarz Criteria for VAR5 with different lags 
  1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 4 Lags 5 Lags 6 Lags 
 Determinant Residual Covariance 9.33E-09 1.59E-09 2.27E-10 7.30E-11 3.64E-11 1.25E-12 
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 135.6285 164.8306 195.3606 209.8191 215.6533 264.9322 
 Akaike Information Criteria -5.875183 -6.7476 -7.742255 -7.875377 -7.509018 -9.753469 
 Schwarz Criteria -4.840918 -5.006067 -5.279003 -4.675803 -3.558437 -5.037203 
. 
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Table 4.11 System Estimation of VAR 5 
System: VAR5     
Estimation Method: Least Squares (Marquardt)   
Sample: 1995:1 2003:3    
Included observations: 35    
Total system (balanced) observations 140   
     
Equation: YGDP = C(1)* YGDP (-1) + C(2)* YGDP (-2) + C(3) 
        * YGDP (-3) + C(4)* YGDP (-4) + C(5)*LOANSttl (-1) + C(6) 
        * LOANSttl (-2) + C(7)* LOANSttl (-3) + C(8)* LOANSttl (-4) + C(9)*i (-1)
        + C(10)* i (-2) + C(11)* i (-3) + C(12)* i (-4) + C(13)*π(-1)  
        + C(14)*π(-2) + C(15)* π(-3) + C(16)  
        *π(-4) + C(17) + C(18)*TIME   
Observations: 35         
R-squared 0.996512     Mean dependent var  7.625348 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993024     S.D. dependent var  0.209351 
S.E. of regression 0.017486     Sum squared resid  0.005198 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.843789       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
YGDP (-1) -0.221563 0.18989 -1.166795 0.2474 
YGDP (-2) -0.008176 0.099415 -0.082238 0.9347 
YGDP (-3) 0.070239 0.065866 1.066393 0.29 
YGDP (-4) 0.161365 0.065148 2.476911 0.0157 
LOANSttl (-1) -0.044438 0.187165 -0.237425 0.813 
LOANSttl (-2) 0.343595 0.245326 1.400563 0.1659 
LOANSttl (-3) -0.190332 0.264978 -0.718295 0.475 
LOANSttl (-4) 0.161059 0.227892 0.706733 0.4821 
i (-1) 0.017946 0.015213 1.179692 0.2422 
i (-2) -0.007211 0.013054 -0.552353 0.5825 
i (-3) 0.011494 0.013139 0.874806 0.3848 
i (-4) -0.003451 0.011878 -0.290563 0.7723 
π (-1) -0.12021 0.051036 -2.355401 0.0214 
π (-2) -0.117333 0.052873 -2.219171 0.0298 
π (-3) -0.150144 0.063008 -2.38291 0.02 
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π (-4) 0.023334 0.03642 0.640693 0.5239 
Constant Term 4.87288 1.093359 4.456798 0 
TIME 0.012353 0.00356 3.469777 0.0009 
     
Equation: LOANSttl = C(19)* YGDP (-1) + C(20)* YGDP (-2) + C(21) 
        * YGDP (-3) + C(22)* YGDP (-4) + C(23)* LOANSttl (-1) + C(24) 
        * LOANSttl (-2) + C(25)* LOANSttl (-3) + C(26)* LOANSttl (-4) + C(27) 
        * i (-1) + C(28)* i (-2) + C(29)* i (-3) + C(30)* i (-4) + C(31)  
        *π(-1) + C(32)* π(-2) + C(33)* π(-3) + 
        C(34)* π(-4) + C(35) + C(36)*TIME   
Observations: 35         
R-squared 0.99696     Mean dependent var  8.81157 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993921     S.D. dependent var  0.401343 
S.E. of regression 0.031292     Sum squared resid  0.016646 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.034889       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
YGDP (-1) -0.54529 0.339815 -1.604667 0.1132 
YGDP (-2) 0.046209 0.177907 0.259739 0.7959 
YGDP (-3) -0.225644 0.11787 -1.914357 0.0598 
YGDP (-4) 0.43377 0.116584 3.720654 0.0004 
LOANSttl (-1) 0.413332 0.334939 1.234053 0.2214 
LOANSttl (-2) 0.284403 0.43902 0.647813 0.5193 
LOANSttl (-3) 0.612624 0.474187 1.291946 0.2007 
LOANSttl (-4) -0.691572 0.407821 -1.695773 0.0945 
i (-1) -0.062877 0.027223 -2.309677 0.0239 
i (-2) 0.042419 0.023361 1.815794 0.0738 
i (-3) -0.002713 0.023512 -0.115403 0.9085 
i (-4) 0.025492 0.021256 1.199294 0.2346 
π (-1) -0.085049 0.09133 -0.931221 0.355 
π (-2) -0.078463 0.094617 -0.829271 0.4099 
π (-3) 0.13286 0.112756 1.178301 0.2428 
π (-4) -0.083408 0.065174 -1.279773 0.205 
Constant Term 5.147532 1.956605 2.630848 0.0105 
TIME 0.019779 0.006371 3.104353 0.0028 
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Equation: i = C(37)* YGDP (-1) + C(38)* YGDP (-2) + C(39)  
        * YGDP (-3) + C(40)* YGDP (-4) + C(41)* LOANSttl (-1) + C(42) 
        * LOANSttl (-2) + C(43)* LOANSttl (-3) + C(44)* LOANSttl (-4) + C(45) 
        * i (-1) + C(46)* i (-2) + C(47)* i (-3) + C(48)* i (-4) + C(49)  
        *π(-1) + C(50)* π(-2) + C(51)* π(-3) + 
        C(52)* π(-4) + C(53) + C(54)*TIME   
Observations: 35       
R-squared 0.995864     Mean dependent var  7.626 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991729     S.D. dependent var  2.511949 
S.E. of regression 0.228456     Sum squared resid  0.887268 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.237542       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
YGDP (-1) 4.860501 2.480924 1.959149 0.0542 
YGDP (-2) -1.378414 1.298868 -1.061242 0.2923 
YGDP (-3) 2.187315 0.860543 2.541785 0.0133 
YGDP (-4) -2.877496 0.851159 -3.380678 0.0012 
LOANSttl (-1) -1.433267 2.445324 -0.586126 0.5597 
LOANSttl (-2) 7.966257 3.2052 2.485417 0.0154 
LOANSttl (-3) -8.806363 3.461951 -2.543758 0.0132 
LOANSttl (-4) -0.353627 2.977425 -0.118769 0.9058 
i (-1) 0.799135 0.198753 4.020737 0.0001 
i (-2) -0.102482 0.170554 -0.600875 0.5499 
i (-3) 0.338911 0.171655 1.97437 0.0524 
i (-4) -0.410839 0.155183 -2.647456 0.0101 
π (-1) 0.840159 0.666785 1.260016 0.212 
π (-2) 1.900823 0.690784 2.751691 0.0076 
π (-3) -0.504206 0.82321 -0.612489 0.5423 
π (-4) 0.830589 0.475826 1.745573 0.0854 
Constant Term 4.491346 14.2848 0.314414 0.7542 
TIME -0.019055 0.046515 -0.409643 0.6834 
     
Equation: π = C(55)* YGDP (-1) + C(56)* YGDP (-2) + 
        C(57)* YGDP (-3) + C(58)* YGDP (-4) + C(59)* LOANSttl (-1) + 
        C(60)* LOANSttl (-2) + C(61)* LOANSttl (-3) + C(62)* LOANSttl (-4) + 
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        C(63)* i (-1) + C(64)* i (-2) + C(65)* i (-3) + C(66)* i (-4) + C(67) 
        *π(-1) + C(68)* π(-2) + C(69)* π(-3) + 
        C(70)* π(-4) + C(71) + C(72)*TIME   
Observations: 35     
R-squared 0.779595     Mean dependent var   -0.011282 
Adjusted R-squared 0.559189     S.D. dependent var  0.173999 
S.E. of regression 0.115524     Sum squared resid  0.22688 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.195533       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
YGDP (-1) 2.173881 1.254538 1.732814 0.0877 
YGDP (-2) 0.229002 0.656803 0.348662 0.7284 
YGDP (-3) 0.626892 0.435154 1.44062 0.1543 
YGDP (-4) -1.582995 0.430409 -3.677885 0.0005 
LOANSttl (-1) 1.454301 1.236536 1.176109 0.2437 
LOANSttl (-2) -1.664957 1.620785 -1.027253 0.3079 
LOANSttl (-3) -0.317438 1.750618 -0.181329 0.8566 
LOANSttl (-4) 1.621717 1.505606 1.077119 0.2852 
i (-1) 0.249458 0.100504 2.482059 0.0155 
i (-2) -0.157411 0.086245 -1.825162 0.0724 
i (-3) 0.055436 0.086802 0.638648 0.5252 
i (-4) -0.110983 0.078472 -1.4143 0.1618 
π (-1) 0.10772 0.337175 0.319477 0.7503 
π (-2) -0.226041 0.349311 -0.647104 0.5197 
π (-3) -0.468106 0.416275 -1.124511 0.2648 
π (-4) 0.253135 0.240613 1.052043 0.2965 
Constant Term -19.57736 7.22345 -2.710251 0.0085 
TIME -0.059082 0.023521 -2.511825 0.0144 
Determinant residual covariance 4.06E-12     
     
 





FDI deflated by GDP deflator Natural logarithm in Foreign Direct Investment deflated by GDP deflator 
FDI deflated by vaule added deflator Natural logarithm in Foreign Direct Investment deflated by Value Added deflator 
GDP deflator GDP in market price over GDP in constant price 
ID deflated by GDP deflator Natural logarithm in Domestic Investment deflated by GDP deflator 
ID deflated by value added deflator Natural logarithm in Domestic Investment deflated by Value Added deflator 
LOANSttl Natural logarithm in nominal total loans deflated by GDP deflator 
LOANSstinsdustrial Natural logarithm in industrial short term loans deflated by value added deflator 
LOANSttlindustrial Natural logarithm in nominal total industrial loans deflated by GDP deflator 
i(working capital 1 yr) Lending rate of working captial 1 year 
i(capital construction loans less than 3 yrs) Lending rate of capital construction loans less than 3 years 
π(GDP deflator) Inflation rate calculated as: △ p*4, where p equals to GDP deflator 
π(Value Added deflator) Inflation rate calculated as: △ p*4, where p equals to value added deflator 
TIME Time Trend 
Value added deflator Value Added in current market price over Value Added in constant price 
YGDP Real GDP in natural logarithm 
YVA Real Value Added of Industrial Sector in logarithm 
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Chapter 5 Panel VAR Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we employed aggregate time series VAR models as the first 
step to conduct causality tests for the banking sector of China. In this chapter, we 
will introduce annual panel VAR models to examine the causality chain of the bank 
lending channel in China. 
 
Similar to the previous chapter, the model of this chapter is an extension of the study 
of Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003). The bank loans and the aggregate output are 
the main focus of our study. In addition, we are also interested in the performance of 
rapid industrializations of Mainland China in the past twenty years (Ma, et al, 2003; 
Ma, 2001b; Tsang and Ma, 1997, 2000). Therefore, a more specific causality test has 
been designed for the industrial sector of the Chinese economy. The bank lending 
channels of different regional blocks are also compared. The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 gives the elaboration of the 
methodology to derive the panel VAR model in this chapter, Section 5.3 presents the 
findings and policy implications of the empirical study and finally, Section 5.4 
concludes this chapter. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
Given the unsatisfactory and unexpected results acquired from aggregate time series 
VAR models in the previous chapter, in this chapter we use the panel VAR model to 
examine the bank lending channel in China. Due to the availability of the variables 
across different regions in China, an unbalanced panel model will be employed to 
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examine the causality of variables in the bank lending channel.  
 
5.2.1 Data Description 
The book entitled “Comprehensive statistical data and materials for 50 years of new 
China” contains the annual data coverage from 1957 to 1998. We select the 
post-reform data from 1977 to 1998. Statistical information of the 27 provinces and 
4 metropolises is provided in this book. Table 5.1 is the list of the categorization of 
the 27 provinces and 3 metropolises into 6 regional blocks. 
 
Table 5.1 Classification of provinces and metropolis into different regional blocks 
Metropolis Northeast Coastal Central Southwest Northwest 
Beijing Liaoning Guangdong Henan Guangxi Inner Mongolia 
Tianjin Jilin Fujian Hubei Sichun Shannxi 
Shanghai Heilongjiang Jiangsu Hunan Guizhou Gansu 
  Zhejiang Anhui Yunan Qinghai 
  Hainan Jiangxi Tibet Ningxia 
  Shandong Shanxi  Xingjiang 
    Hebei       
 
Chongqing metropolis is excluded from the model as the economic data of this city 
is only available after 1992. Besides, to utilize the most updated data, we collected 
the information from statistical yearbooks for each individual province or metropolis 
for the period of 1999 to 2003. Annual data includes the national aggregate output 
(GDP) and GDP of the industrial sector (iGDP), both in constant prices. All 
variables of total bank loans and industrial loans of the national banking system, as 
well as foreign direct investment actually utilized in each year, have been deflated 
by appropriate deflators available to obtain their constant price series. We have two 
deflators available, namely the GDP deflator and the industrial GDP (iGDP) deflator. 
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Expected inflation rate and domestic investment1 are derived by the author (cf. 
footnote 2 in Section 5.2.2). The annual lending interest rate is collected from 
International Financial Statistical Book of the IMF, which is the year-ended prime 
rate for working capital of one year. 
 
Figure 5.1 provides the volume of total China bank loans in 1978, 1990 and 2002. In 
2002, the volumes of bank loans in Beijing and Shanghai have similar levels to 
those of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, while the provinces , except Sichuan, 
only have bank loans below five hundred billion yuan in 2002. It is found that bank 
loans decrease from east to west, with the lowest ones in the Northwest regional 
block. 
 
Figure 5.2 provides the amount of Gross Domestic Product of China in 1978, 1990 
and 2002. Other Coastal provinces experienced relatively good records when 
compared with their counterparts in 2002. Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong are 
the richest provinces from the data. They represent the pioneering economic 
development in the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and Yellow River Delta 
according to their geographical location. The output differentials also varied from 
the coastal areas to the inland ones. 
 
Figure 5.3 provide the inflation rates across different regions. There is no explicit 
pattern indicating which region has inflation or deflation. Yet there are two 
provinces that are outlying areas. One is Hubei in which -0.002% deflation has been 
recorded and another one is Tibet which experienced 0.1% inflation in 2002. 
                                                 
1 Domestic investment equals to gross capital formation minus respective foreign direct investment.  
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Figure 5.4 shows interest rate changes in China from 1978 to 2002. The interest rate 
climbed up to its peak in 1990 and then fell in 1992 due to the administrative policy 
of soft landing policy for the economy in the early 1990s. The year 1996 is another 
climax of the interest rate. After that, it gradually decreased from 12% to around 5%. 
 


































































Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate domestic investment and foreign direct investment of 
China in various years. For the foreign direct investment, other coastal regions have 
adsorbed substantial capacity of foreign capital inflow. For example, Guangdong 
and Jiangsu has experienced 93.81 and 84.3 billion RMB in 2002. Shandong has had 
strong performance in domestic investment, which experienced 387 billion RMB. 
Provinces in the central region share the amount of domestic investment almost 
equally. 
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5.2.2 The Model 
According to literatures and previous theoretical work on the bank lending channel 
(cf. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), the basic specification of panel VARs is the same as 
that of time series VARs in Chapter 4. The difference is that we will first examine 
the time series VARs in each province or metropolis. We will then compute the 
Granger causality statistic of panel VARs by adopting the Fisher equation reviewed 
by Maddala and Wu (1999) as a simple way to investigate unbalanced panel model. 
The classification of provinces and metropolises into 6 different regional blocks is 
based on the grouping method of Demurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao and Chang (2002), 
which is according to the geographical and economic characteristics of various 
locations. 
 
The determinants of the loans issued by the banking sector include lending rate, 
inflation rate, domestic investment and foreign direct investment. The basic model is 
specified in the log-linear form: 
 
Yjt = fj( loansjt , ijt , πjt ) + εjt       (1) 
 
where fj(.) is the functional form for province j, subscripts j and t indicate province j 
and year t respectively, Y and loans denote the natural logarithms of real GDP and 
real value of the loans. The nominal interest rate is represented by i; and π stands for 
the annualized inflation rate2. The error term is εjt. 
                                                 
2 Adopting the method used by Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2003), π should refer to the rate of 
expected inflation in principle. But since inflation expectations are not directly observable and there 
are several difficulties in their estimation, the conventional approach in the empirical work consists of 
taking contemporaneous inflation as a proxy (implicitly relying on the assumption that expectations 
are on average in line with the outcomes). 
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To consider the impacts of investments (domestic investment IDjt and foreign ones 
FDIjt) in the process of bank lending channel, equation (1) is expanded to the 
following: 
Yjt = fj( loansjt , ijt , πjt , ID jt , FDIjt ) + εjt   (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are just two examples of the whole banking-lending channel 
mechanism, which is actually estimated by the provincial time series Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model. Define Zjt = (loansjt, Yjt, ijt, πjt), or Zjt =  (loansjt, Yjt, 
ijt, πjt, ID jt, FDIjt) for each province j. The VAR equations are expressed as follows: 
 
VAR (qj):   Zjt = βj0+βj1Zj,t-1+βj2Zj,t-2+…βjqZj,t-qj+εjt  (3) 
 
where βj0 to βjq are parameters.  
The number of lags (qj) in each VAR is set to minimize the value of Schwarz 
Criteria as in Table 5.2. To avoid the pre-test bias that may arise from the integration 
and cointegration tests on the time series vector Zjt, we apply the surplus lag 
estimation (Lukepohl and Burda, 1997; Sun and Ma, 2004) to test the Granger 
causality from one variable to another. That is, we estimate a VAR with qj+1 lag and 
then only apply the Wald test on the coefficients of the variables with lags up to qj to 
conduct the Granger causality test. 
 
VAR (qj+1): Zjt = βj0+βj1Zj,t-1+βj2Zj,t-2+…βjqZj,t-q+βj,qj+1Zj,t-(qj+1)+εjt (4) 
 
Based on the availability of data, variables are grouped into 4 different panel vector 
autoregressive (PVAR) models. Table 5.3 lists the summary of different 
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combinations of the variables in each named panel VAR model. 
 
We now take PVAR Model 2 as an example to demonstrate how to obtain the result 
of each pair of causality (see Statistical Appendix of this chapter).  
 
First of all, it is required to consider the Schwarz Criteria in every provincial VAR 
with different lags (see, for example, Table 5.2a for lag 1) to find the optimal lags (qj) 
(see summary results in Tables 5.2 (a) and (b)). For example, in PVAR Model 2, the 
optimal lag qj for Beijing is in 1 with a minimized Schwarz Criteria -3.32.  
 
According to Lukepohl and Burda (1997), lags (qj+1) will be adopted to conduct the 
Granger causality tests based on system estimation of VAR for Beijing, for example. 
The system estimation is therefore based on 2 lags. The advantage of the system 
estimation is its efficiency in estimating the parameters. 
 
Following that, based on the system estimation of Beijing’s VAR with 2 lags, we 
apply the Wald test to test the hypothesis of no Granger causality, for example, from 
loans to GDP, i.e., the parameter of variable loans with first lag is zero in the 
equation of GDP. Suppose the probability of this hypothesis, i.e. the p-value, is pj for 
province j.  Then we repeat the same test for all other provinces in panel VAR 
Model 2 to obtain their p-value pj. Finally we employ the following Fisher equation 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999) to compute the Wald statistic for the PVAR model:  
-2 Σ log pj ～ χ2 
with 2N degrees of freedom. N is the number of provinces in the panel VAR. 
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Table 5.2 (a) Summary of Schwarz Criteria in Panel VAR Models   
Model 1    Model 2    
Regions 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags Regions 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags
Beijing 1.05 1.56 0.43† Beijing -3.32† / NA 
Tianjin 5.04† 7.46 8.58 Tianjin 11.51† 16.02 / 
Shanghai -2.86† -0.71 0.09 Shanghai -2.28† -2.21 / 
Liaoning -2.13† -0.06 1.74 Liaoning -3.04† / NA 
Jilin -1.54† -0.37 -0.31 Jilin 5.42† / NA 
Heilongjiang -3.63† -1.58 -3.24 Heilongjiang -3.22† / NA 
Guangdong 5.1† 6.33 7.08 Guangdong 7.3† 8.25 / 
Fujian -2.05† -1.71 -0.63 Fujian -0.36 -3.75† / 
Jiangsu -1.33† -1.13 1.17 Jiangsu -5.89† / NA 
Zhejiang -0.39† 0.53 0.39 Zhejiang -2.72† / NA 
Hainan 2.36† 4.48 4.67 Hainan 3.89† 3.97 NA 
Shandong -2.22† -1.26 -2.07 Shandong 1.85† / NA 
Hebei -2.74† -1.63 -2.61 Hebei -4.84† / NA 
Henan 3.53† 5.64 5.09 Henan 5.73† / NA 
Hubei -1.91† -0.73 -0.19 Hubei -4.18† / NA 
Hunan 0.04 -0.57† -0.42 Hunan 0.04† / NA 
Anhui -0.53† 1.22 2.88 Anhui -3.44† / NA 
Jiangxi 4.27† 5.98 6.6 Jiangxi 4.44† / NA 
Shanxi -0.52† 1.27 2.5 Shanxi 0.96† / NA 
Guangxi 2.14† 2.61 / Guangxi 3.46† / NA 
Sichuan 0.12† 1.6 / Sichuan -3† / NA 
Guizhou 2.8† 5.53 5.198 Guizhou -5.54† / NA 
Yuannan 1.49† 2.6 4.03 Yuannan 2.16† / NA 
Tibet 1.53† 3.51 1.87 Tibet NA NA NA 
Inner Mongolia -1.76† 0.66 -0.32 Inner Mongolia NA NA NA 
Shannxi -1.4† -0.66 0.38 Shannxi -3.7† / NA 
Gansu 2.34† 4.77 5.11 Gansu 2.2† / NA 
Qinghai -0.43† 1.12 0.13 Qinghai 3.61† / NA 
Ningxia 7.43 4.08 3.03† Ningxia NA NA NA 
Xingjiang 3.71† 5.73 7.69 Xingjiang -1.71† / NA 
        
Note: † denotes optimal lag for the VARs for definitions of each VAR, see Table 5.3. 
     ‘/’ means not available that E-view could not provide the Schwarz Criteria 
     “NA” means not applicable that not enough observations for E-View to estimate 
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Table 5.2 (b) Summary of Schwarz Criteria in Panel VAR Models 
Model 3    Model 4    
Regions 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags Regions 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags
Beijing -0.49† 1.36 2.93 Beijing -1.53† / NA 
Tianjin 1.21† 2 2.42 Tianjin 7.89† 10.97 - 
Shanghai 9.49 8.08 6.07† Shanghai 7.41 5.31† / 
Liaoning -0.03† 1.22 1.92 Liaoning -1.57† / NA 
Jilin 4.78† 6.29 7.65 Jilin 8.8† / NA 
Heilongjiang -0.99† -0.9 1.62 Heilongjiang -0.56† / NA 
Guangdong 1.1† 1.39 3.61 Guangdong 3.21† 5.08 NA 
Fujian NA NA NA Fujian NA NA NA 
Jiangsu 1.54† 2.63 4.49 Jiangsu -1.25† / NA 
Zhejiang 0.32† 1.06 0.66 Zhejiang -3.43† / NA 
Hainan 2.9 3.97 0.49† Hainan 5.37† 6.91 NA 
Shandong -0.13† 1.8 2.83 Shandong 4.23† / NA 
Hebei 1.64† 3.36 5.09 Hebei 1† / NA 
Henan -1.51† 0.56 1.14 Henan -2.56† / NA 
Hubei 0.15† 0.27 / Hubei -1.66† / NA 
Hunan 3.48 1.49† 2.98 Hunan 0.75† / NA 
Anhui -0.12† 0.4 1.15 Anhui -1.76† / NA 
Jiangxi 5.52† 7.38 10.23 Jiangxi 6.19† / NA 
Shanxi -0.86† 0.74 0.21 Shanxi 0.55† / NA 
Guangxi 0.88† 1.94 / Guangxi 1.1† / NA 
Sichuan 0.89† 2.26 / Sichuan 1.98† / NA 
Guizhou -0.49† 0.81 1.54 Guizhou -4.3† / NA 
Yuannan -0.21† 0.94 2.67 Yuannan 2.83† / NA 
Tibet 7.18† 8.49 10.8 Tibet NA NA NA 
Inner Mongolia -0.78† 1.2 2.48 Inner Mongolia NA NA NA 
Shannxi 2.15† 2.67 3.62 Shannxi 1.66† / NA 
Gansu 3.65† 5.87 7.02 Gansu 4.99† / NA 
Qinghai 0.29† 0.98 3.25 Qinghai 7.69† / NA 
Ningxia 0.52† 0.18 1.12 Ningxia NA NA NA 
Xingjiang 1.59† 2.69 3.46 Xingjiang 4.22† / NA 
        
Note: † denotes optimal lag for the VARs for definitions of each VAR, see Table 5.3 
‘/’ means not available that E-view could not provide the Schwarz Criteria 
      “NA” means not applicable that not enough observations for E-View to estimate 
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Table 5.3 Structure of Panel VAR Models          
Model 1: GDPj,t = f(Loansj,t, ij,t, πj,t) + εj,t     
Provinces included: 30             
Coastal Metropolis Beijing Tianjin Shanghai     
Northeast Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang     
Other Coastal Guangdong Fujian Jiangsu Zhejiang Hainan Shandong Hebei 
Central Henan Hubei Hunan Anhui Jiangxi Shanxi  
Southwest Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yuannan Tibet   
Northwest Inner Mongolia Shannxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xingjiang  
        
Model 2: GDPj,t = f(Loansj,t , ij,t , πj,t , ID,j,t , FDIjt ) + εj,t     
Provinces included: 27             
Coastal Metropolis Beijing Tianjin Shanghai     
Northeast Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang     
Other Coastal Guangdong Fujian Jiangsu Zhejiang Hainan Shandong Hebei 
Central Henan Hubei Hunan Anhui Jiangxi Shanxi  
Southwest Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yuannan    
Northwest Shannxi Gansu Qinghai Xingjiang    
        
Model 3: iGDPj,t = f(iLoansj,t, ij,t, π2,j,t) + εj,t     
Provinces included: 29             
Coastal Metropolis Beijing Tianjin Shanghai     
Northeast Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang     
Other Coastal Guangdong Jiangsu Zhejiang Hainan Shandong Hebei  
Central Henan Hubei Hunan Anhui Jiangxi Shanxi  
Southwest Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yuannan Tibet   
Northwest Inner Mongolia Shannxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xingjiang  
        
Model 4: iGDPj,t = f(iLoansj,t, ij,t, π2,j,t, ID2,j,t , FDI2,j,t) + εj,t     
Provinces included: 26             
Coastal Metropolis Beijing Tianjin Shanghai     
Northeast Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang     
Other Coastal Guangdong Jiangsu Zhejiang Hainan Shandong Hebei  
Central Henan Hubei Hunan Anhui Jiangxi Shanxi  
Southwest Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yuannan    
Northwest Shannxi Gansu Qinghai Xingjiang       
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The Wald test provides the p-value based on the chi-squared distribution. If the 
p-value is below, say, 5% (0.05), then the hypothesis is rejected and Granger 
causality is found.  
 
5.3 Empirical Results 
The availability of the data is a constraint for the whole research. The observations 
of each province or metropolis are different. To tackle this problem, an unbalanced 
panel model is therefore adopted to exhaust all potential data as fully as possible. It 
is found that the results varied from the grouping of variables in different equations. 
Fortunately, the panel model provides fruitful results for discussion. Tables 5.4 (a) to 
(f) give the results of Model 2, which is the representative PVAR model (other 
PVAR models give similar results). Based on the theoretical paradigm of the bank 
lending channel, the Granger causality tests provide evidence that the bank lending 
channel in China has an interactive and dynamic relationship. All the causality pairs 
are significant. This means that all the factors within the bank lending channel have 
a direct causality to each other. There are multi-causalities within the bank lending 
channel. For example, the statistics show that there is direct causality from bank 
loans to GDP, and the reverse causality from GDP to bank loans also exists.  
 
One should be cautious to jump to the conclusion that there are causalities of the 
aggregate bank lending because it is highly possible that a neutralization effect of 
the aggregation may exist. The comparison and contrast of the similarities and 
differences in causalities among different regional blocks are important in 
explaining the unsatisfactory results of the quarterly aggregate time series model in 
the previous chapter (c.f. Section 4.3 of Chapter 4). 












The hypothesized impacts and causalities are addressed in Chapter 3. The following 
discussion is constructed from the above diagram, Figure 5.7, which provides a 
visual aid for the transmission mechanism of panel model in the bank lending 
channel of China. Each arrow represents the causality from one variable to another. 
In the following discussion, panel VAR Model 2 has been taken as an example for 
the elaboration of the research findings of bank lending channel of the Chinese 
economy. Other panel VAR models give similar results. However, the panel VAR 
tests do not provide the signs of significant impact of causality in the overall panel 
model. The discussions of these signs are based therefore on the results of time 
















Figure 5.7 Linkages of Bank Lending Channel of China of Panel Model 
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differences among the provinces. 
 
5.3.1 The Determinants of Interest Rate Policy 
5.3.1 (a) Bank loans as a Determinant Variable (Bank Loans => Interest Rate) 
Our discussion begins with the interest rate policy. From the previous chapter’s 
aggregate time series VAR models, there is a Granger causality from bank loans to 
interest rate and the coefficient is negative. The results of panel VARs (c.f. Table 
5.4a) suggest that there is a strong Granger causality from bank loans to interest rate 
in the whole country.  
 
The blocks of Other Coastal, Southwest and Northwest regions also show that bank 
loans have significant impact on interest rate. However, it seems that not all 
provinces have the same sign of the impacts. Provinces of the Northwest region 
consistently have positive causality. The reason is that the Northwest region is a less 
developed area in China. The capacity of loans ready for lending is always 
inadequate. An increase of demand for loans can raise the interest rate in order for 
banks to choose potential borrowers.  
 
Provinces included in the other coastal regions have different results. There is a 
positive causality for 4 provinces and a negative causality for the other 3 provinces. 
The negative causality suggests that an increase in supply of bank loans leads to a 
decrease in interest rate in certain provinces. 
 
5.3.1 (b) Domestic Investment as a Determinant Variable (ID => Interest Rate) 
There is no Granger causality from domestic investment to interest rate in the 
previous chapter’s aggregate time series model. In the panel model, they have a 
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significant causality. In the national PVAR model, there is a very strong causality 
from domestic investment to interest rate at the 1% significance level. 
 
Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant
Statistic impact
For equation i :
Coefficient of GDP(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 5.42 GDP =\=> i
Northeast 8.19 GDP =\=> i
Other Coastal 476.31*** GDP ==> i (+)
Central 21.9** GDP ==> i (+ + / - - - -)
Southwest 7.12 GDP =\=> i
Northwest 9.21 GDP =\=> i
National 531.14*** GDP ==> i
Coefficient of LOANS(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 7.22 LOANS =\=> i
Northeast 5.15 LOANS =\=> i
Other Coastal 476.8*** LOANS ==> i (+ + + + / - - -)
Central 10.79 LOANS =\=> i
Southwest 18.24** LOANS ==> i (+ + / - -)
Northwest 458.76*** LOANS ==> i (+)
National 977.14*** LOANS ==> i
Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 6.82 π ==> i
Northeast 3.81 π =\=> i
Other Coastal 473.34*** π ==> i (+ ++  /  - - - -)
Central 20.02 π =\=> i
Southwest 37.10*** π ==> i (+)
Northwest 63.13*** π ==> i (+ + + / -)
National 604.23*** π ==> i
Coefficient of ID (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 9.03 ID =\= > i
Northeast 3.41 ID =\= > i
Other Coastal 477.30*** ID == > i (+ + / - - - - -)
Central 44.30*** ID == > i (+)
Southwest 7.6 ID =\= > i
Northwest 8.23 ID =\= > i
National 549.87*** ID == > i
Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 16.13** FDI ==> i (+ + /-)
Northeast 14.05* FDI ==> i (+ + / -)
Other Coastal 471.22*** FDI ==> i (+ + + + / - - -)
Central 74.44*** FDI ==> i (+ + + + / - -)
Southwest 10.69 FDI =\=> i
Northwest 9.73 FDI =\=> i
National 596.26*** FDI ==> i
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
System Esatimation: Panel VAR Model 2
Table 5.4a Causality Test of Panel VAR Model 2: for equation of Interest Rate
          Null hypothesis of Fujian in Other Coastal  is to test all coeffiecients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
Null Hypothesis: ConclusionRegions
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There are two regional blocks that show significant Granger causality: they are 
Other Coastal and the Central regions. Interestingly, 6 provinces in the central region 
all have a consistent positive Granger causality. The reason behind this is that the 
Central region has less foreign investment than the Coastal region. Therefore, to a 
certain extent, domestic investment plays an essential role for economic 
development for the Central region. In order to finance the investment projects, 
investors need to borrow from banks or other non-banking intermediaries. Therefore, 
with the implementation of continuous and new investment projects, demand for 
loans increases and it leads to an increase in interest rate. 
 
5.3.1 (c) Foreign Direct Investment as a Determinant Variable  
(FDI => Interest Rate) 
Similar to the impact of domestic investment on interest rate, there is no causality 
from foreign direct investment to interest rate in the previous chapter’s aggregate 
time series model.  
 
The panel model, however, provides significant evidence for this causality at the 
national level. Furthermore, Coastal Metropolis, Northeast, Other Coastal and 
Central blocks also all show Granger causality from foreign direct investment to 
interest rate. Among 16 provinces and 3 metropolises in these regional blocks, 12 of 
them show that foreign direct investment has positive effect on interest rate, despite 
the fact that the Northeast block only has 10% significance. The reason for the 
positive causality is similar to the reason for the positive causality from domestic 
investment to interest rate. Increase in interest rate is a subsequent response of keen 
foreign investment project seeking domestic finance for working capital for 
example.  
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However, it is noted that no causalities could be found from either domestic 
investment or foreign direct investment to interest rate in the aggregate time series 
model in Chapter 4. The reasons are two-fold. From the economic viewpoint, the 
effects from different regions may have neutralized each other and therefore 
insignificant results are shown in aggregate level. The second perspective is from the 
econometric side. The limited observations affect the power of the aggregate time 
series test. Therefore, it can not detect the results found from the panel model. 
 
5.3.1 (d) Economic Output as a Determinant Variable (GDP => Interest Rate) 
Interest rate is adjusted according to the economic performance. The panel model in 
the national level provided significant results to support this conventional argument. 
Gross Domestic Product positively affected interest rate. The block of other coastal 
regions is grouped by provinces along the coastal line of China. Seven of them 
consistently provide the positive causality of economic output on interest rate. The 
direct causality suggests that Gross Domestic Product can directly affect the level of 
interest rate. 
 
5.3.1 (e) Inflation Rate as a Determinant Variable (Inflation=> Interest Rate) 
Inflation is the result of excessive economic growth from a monetarist viewpoint. 
The interest rate policy can adjust the money supply and therefore alleviates the 
pressure of inflation. Thus, the expected sign of impact of inflation on interest rate is 
positive. In panel VAR blocks of Other Coastal, Southwest and Northwest, there is 
significant causality from inflation rate to interest rate at the 1% significance level. 
Southwest and Northwest provinces provide significant results that interest rate is 
sensitively affected by inflation rate. Because an enormous development project in 
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the western region in the latest triennium has accelerated the pace of economic 
growth in this region. Hence, inflation is partly created by economic development. 
Consequently, inflation could lead interest rate to react sensitively. 
 
5.3.2 The Determinants of Bank Loans 
Based on Table 5.4b, the causalities are discussed as follows. 
5.3.2 (a) Interest Rate as a Determinant Variable (Interest Rate => Bank Loans) 
The empirical results in the previous chapter’s aggregate time series model suggest 
that there was a negative impact of interest rate on bank loans. The results of panel 
VARs also support this conclusion, except for the Fujian and Yuannan from the other 
coastal and Southwest regions respectively. An increase in interest rate can defy the 
incentive for borrowing from banks, as firms are concerned about their the ability to 
pay back the outstanding loans and interests. 
 
5.3.2 (b) Domestic Investment as a Determinant Variable (ID => Bank Loans) 
Domestic investment shows positive impact on bank loans in the panel VAR models, 
although no Granger causality could be found between them in aggregate time series 
model in the previous chapter. Increasing domestic investment projects require 
capital to invest. The main financing sources in China are bank loans. The total 
effects from Northeast and Other Coastal blocks give evidence that domestic 
investment has significant impact on bank loans, which makes the national panel 
VAR model also significant in this relationship. These 2 regional blocks have 
relatively long established economic development records since the economic 
reform in 1978. They are the beneficiaries of the open-door policy. The reason why 
results of the aggregate time series model in Chapter 3 gave no causality is that these 
two regional blocks include 10 provinces, 5 of them showing positive impact and the 
  Chapter 5 
 78
remaining ones showing negative impact. The neutralization effects from 
aggregation therefore occur and no causality exists in the aggregate time series 
model. 
Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant
Statistic impact
For equation LOANS :
Coefficients of GDP(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 19.08*** GDP ==> LOANS (+ + / -)
Northeast 15.12** GDP ==> LOANS (-)
Other Coastal 67.52*** GDP ==> LOANS (+ + + + / - -)
Central 11.18 GDP =\=> LOANS
Southwest 24.91*** GDP ==> LOANS (+ + / - -)
Northwest 6.29 GDP =\=> LOANS
National 144.08*** GDP ==> LOANS
Coefficient of i (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 1.47 i =\=>LOANS
Northeast 12.6 i =\=>LOANS
Other Coastal 46.49*** i ==>LOANS (+ / - - - - - -)
Central 9.44 i =\=>LOANS
Southwest 18.03** i ==>LOANS (+ / - -)
Northwest 3.22 i =\=>LOANS
National 91.26** i ==>LOANS
Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 18.89*** π ==> LOANS (+ / - -)
Northeast 5.15 π =\=> LOANS
Other Coastal 462.68*** π ==> LOANS (+ / - - - - - -)
Central 14.19 π =\=> LOANS
Southwest 24.57*** π ==> LOANSt (-)
Northwest 6.09 π =\=> LOANS
National 531.57*** π ==> LOANS
Coefficient of ID (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 2.38 ID =\=> LOANS
Northeast 18.44** ID ==> LOANS (+ / - -)
Other Coastal 465.04*** ID ==> LOANS (+ + + + / - -)
Central 9.6 ID =\=> LOANS
Southwest 12.89 ID =\=> LOANS
Northwest 2.35 ID =\=> LOANS
National 510.7*** ID ==> LOANS
Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 10.23 FDI =\=> LOANS
Northeast 2.39 FDI =\=> LOANS
Other Coastal 82.92*** FDI ==> LOANS (+ + + + + + / -)
Central 4.84 FDI =\=> LOANS
Southwest 5.93 FDI =\=> LOANS
Northwest 3.58 FDI =\=> LOANS
National 109.9*** FDI ==> LOANS
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
System Estimation: Panel VAR Model 2
Table 5.4b Causality Test of Panel VAR Model 2: for equation of Bank Loans
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
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5.3.2 (c) Foreign Direct Investment as Determinant Variable (FDI=>Bank 
Loans) 
In the previous chapter’s aggregate time series model VAR 4, there was evidence of 
weak causality from foreign direct investment to bank loans. The result suggests that 
an increase in foreign direct investment also leads to an increase in bank loans.  
 
The panel VAR models provide various results for this pair of causality. Other 
Coastal regional block is the only block which shows a significant result of this pair 
of causality, which is strong enough to make the national panel VAR model also 
significant in this relationship. All provinces in this region, except Hainan, give 
positive impact. Because the Coastal region has long been the area which receives a 
large amount of foreign investment inflow. Similar to the causality from domestic 
investment to bank loans, foreign investors also acquire bank loans as a source of 
external finance for their working capital, therefore, an increase in foreign direct 
investment also leads to an increase in bank loans from the Chinese banking sector. 
 
As to the relationship between foreign direct investment and domestic investment, 
please refer to subsection 5.3.3(c) and 5.3.4(c). 
 
5.3.2 (d) Economic Output as Determinant Variable (GDP=>Bank Loans) 
Interestingly, the panel VARs show that the Granger causality from Gross Domestic 
Product to bank loans is significant at the 1% level. However, it is difficult to predict 
the sign of the total impact. Because some provinces have positive impact and the 
remaining ones have a negative one. For the positive ones, such as Beijing, Tianjin 
and Shandong, the reason for positive effect is that an increase in national income 
(i.e. GDP) leads to an increase in aggregate spending. Investment and household 
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consumption required an increase in demand for loans. 
 
Shanghai, Guangdong and the whole Northeast region, however, have negative 
impacts. It is obvious to say that they experienced the speedy pace of economic 
growth. However, the continuous and tremendous increase in Gross Domestic 
Product may make people not willing to borrow and banks may be reluctant to lend 
(Zhao, Ma, et al, 2002) as they fear that the rapid economic growth might be just a 
bubble. Therefore, bank loans are conversely decreased. 
 
5.3.2 (e) Inflation rate as Determinant Variable (Inflation => Bank Loans) 
An increase of inflation rate causes a decrease in bank loans. The previous chapter’s 
aggregate time series VARs provide the evidence that for an 1% increase in inflation 
rate results in an almost a 0.2% decrease in bank loans is resulted (c.f. VAR 3, 4, 6, 7 
and 8 of Chapter 4).  
 
From the group of Coastal Metropolis and Jiangsu from Other Coastal block, the 
panel VARs results of all the provinces except Shanghai are consistent with the 
result of previous aggregate time series VARs. Negative causalities suggest that the 
rise of inflation rate delays investment and consumption, so it leads to a decrease in 
the size of bank loans. Southwest region gives evidence for this type of causality, as 
the signs of significant impacts of all provinces are negative. 
 
5.3.3 Determinants of Domestic Investment 
The discussion here concentrates on the results of Table 5.4c on the following page. 
5.3.3 (a) Interest Rate as a Determinant Variable (Interest Rate => ID) 
Results of panel VAR Model 2 provide significant results of Granger causality from 
  Chapter 5 
 81
interest rate to domestic investment, although no Granger causality could be found 
for this pair of variables from the aggregate time series model in the previous 
chapter. Results of the Southwest regional block strongly support the analytical 
paradigm of monetary transmission mechanism in Section 3.3A. Negative impact 
represents that interest rate is a crucial indicator for domestic investment. Local 
firms are sensitive to the level of interest rate. With increasing interest rate, the cost 
and the risks of investment by local enterprises also increased. Therefore, interest 
rate has negative impact on domestic investment. 
 
5.3.3 (b) Bank Loans as a Determinant Variable (Bank Loans => ID) 
Refering to the previous discussion, an increase in the amount of bank loans leads to 
an increase in investment and therefore a positive causality is expected among them. 
Though aggregate time series VARs in the previous chapter could not provide any 
evidence to support the above argument, satisfactory results are obtained in the panel 
VARs of Coastal Metropolis, Other Coastal and Southwest regional blocks. Hence, 
at the national level the impact is also significant. 
 
As capital is needed for domestic investment, bank loans provide opportunities for 
local firms to invest. This is the normal relationship of several areas like Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and Sichuan. However, some surprising 
results happened in Tianjin, Hainan, Hebei and Yuannan which have negative impact 
of bank loans on domestic investment. The story behind this may be related to the 
crowding out effect of competition for bank loans between domestic investment and 
foreign direct investment in these areas. This issue will be discussed in Subsection 
5.3.3(c) below. 
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Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant
Statistic impact
For equation I D :
Coefficient of GDP(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 20.31*** GDP ==> ID (+ + / -)
Northeast 5.72 GDP =\=> ID
Other Coastal 466.6*** GDP ==> ID (+ + + + + / - -)
Central 31.92*** GDP ==> ID (+ + + + / - -)
Southwest 569.01*** GDP ==> ID (+ + + / -)
Northwest 8.78 GDP =\=> ID
National 1102.33*** GDP ==> ID
Coefficient of LOANS(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 12.64* LOANS ==> ID (+ + / -)
Northeast 4.87 LOANS =\=> ID
Other Coastal 461.43*** LOANS ==> ID (+ + + + + / - -)
Central 13.12 LOANS =\=> ID
Southwest 111.63*** LOANS ==> ID (+ + + / -)
Northwest 2.75 LOANS =\=> ID
National 606.43*** LOANS ==> ID
Coefficient of i (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 8.79 i  =\=> ID
Northeast 5.64 i  =\=> ID
Other Coastal 462.48*** i  ==> ID (+ + + / - - - -)
Central 13.51 i  =\=> ID
Southwest 99.69*** i  ==> ID (-)
Northwest 4.33 i  =\=> ID
National 594.43*** i  ==> ID
Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 3.27 π =\=> ID
Northeast 7.4 π =\=> ID
Other Coastal 464.53*** π ==> ID (+ / - - - - -)
Central 7.62 π =\=> ID
Southwest 86.8*** π ==> ID (-)
Northwest 3.14 π =\=> ID
National 572.75*** π ==> ID
Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 14.12* FDI ==> ID (+ + / -)
Northeast 7.83 FDI =\=> ID
Other Coastal 71.76*** FDI ==> ID (+ + + + + / - -)
Central 20 FDI =\=> ID
Southwest 497.8*** FDI ==> ID (+ + / - -)
Northwest 10.26 FDI =\=> ID
National 621.72*** FDI ==> ID
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
          Null hypothesis of Fujian in Other Coastal  is to test all coeffiecients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
Table 5.4c Causality Test of Panel VAR Model 2: for equation of Domestic Investment
Null Hypothesis: Regions Conclusion
System Estimation: Panel VAR Model 2
 
5.3.3 (c) Foreign Direct Investment as Determinant Variable (FDI => ID) 
Literatures suggest that there is likely a crowding out effect of foreign direct 
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investment on domestic investment (Taylor, 1998; Harrison and McMillan, 2003). 
Because with the continuous influx of foreign direct investment, local firms face 
credit constraints from bank lending. Taylor (1998) and Harrison and McMillan 
(2003) have similar empirical results found in different states of the U.S. and 
countries in the Ivory Coast. In this research, panel VARs provide two insights into 
this pair of variables. If foreign direct investment has negative impact on domestic 
investment, there is a crowding out and substitution effect. However, positive impact 
of foreign direct investment implies that there is no crowding out effect but there is a 
complementary effect between this pair of variables. The result is quite interesting 
that 4 provinces (Tianjin, Hainan, Hebei, and Yuannan) have experienced the 
crowding-out effect while the others experienced the complementary effect. 
 
The Chinese Government is keen on providing substantial benefits for foreign 
corporations in order to attract their investment. The local officials rush to adsorb 
the foreign investment. Yet, they have overlooked the crowding out effect which 
influenced the operation of domestic firms. Domestic investment of Beijing, Fujian, 
Heibei, Sichuan and Guizhou is reduced because of foreign direct investment.  
 
5.3.3 (d) Economic Output as Determinant Variable (GDP => ID) 
In the previous chapter’s aggregate time series model, Gross Domestic Product 
positively affects domestic investment. When the aggregate GDP increases, it leads 
to a rise in domestic investment.  
 
Panel VARs provide diversified results which give another story behind this pair of 
causality. Coastal Metropolis, Other Coastal and Central, Southwest blocks have 
significant result of the causality from Gross Domestic Product to domestic 
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investment, which leads to a significant result in the national panel VAR. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, positive impact means that the performance of GDP affects 
the confidence of investors. Therefore, promising figures of GDP can make local 
firms bounce up to invest. On the other hand, negative impact may result due to the 
strong competition for banking loans from foreign investors. Conversely, it causes 
domestic investment to decrease. A sound performance of aggregate output also 
attracts foreign investors to crush in. That hinders the expansion of domestic 
investment and more seriously, it leads to the contraction in local firms. 
 
5.3.3 (e) Inflation Rate as Determinant Variable (Inflation => ID) 
Although there are exceptional results obtained from Jiangsu, the results of the 
remaining provinces from Other Coastal and Southwest regional blocks have 
negative impact of inflation rate on domestic investment. Other Coastal region has 
long been the destination for foreign capital. With the encouragement from the 
central government, the Southwest region aims to attract more foreign direct 
investment to mobilize the western economic exploration in China. If there is an 
increase in inflation rate, this leads to an uncertainty about the future return on 
investments and discourages investment from foreigners. The above result is in 
contrast to the aggregate time series VARs in Chapter 4 where no causality was 
found in this pair of variables. Because limited observations reduced the power of 
the time series test. 
 
5.3.4 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
5.3.4 (a) Interest Rate as a Determinant Variable (Interest Rate => FDI) 
The result of the national panel VAR model indicates the Granger causality from 
interest rate to foreign direct investment. However, the signs of significant impact in 
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provinces show positive relationship of this pair of variables which contradicts the 
expected sign in Chapter 3.  
 
Domestic investments are sensitive to interest rate. A rise in interest rate can 
decrease investments of domestic firms. As there is keen competition between 
domestic firms and foreign invested firms, the credit constraints of domestic firms 
provide an opportunity for foreign direct investment to expand3 into the domestic 
market. Therefore, there is a positive causality from interest rate to foreign direct 
investment. 
 
5.3.4 (b) Bank Loans as a Determinant Variable (Bank loans => FDI) 
The result of the causality from bank loans to foreign direct investment in the 
previous chapter’s aggregate time series VARs is positive only in 10% significance. 
The panel VARs succeed in providing results at the 5% significant level for the 
positive impact of bank loans on foreign direct investment in Southwest regional 
block. An increase in bank loans contributes to an increase in investment. It is 
consistent with the findings in the US by Bernanke (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995). 
 
However, the results from the Northwest region indicate that there is a negative 
impact of bank loans on foreign direct investment. An increase in bank loans cannot 
attract more foreign capital inflow, conversely, the bank loans decease foreign direct 
investment. A great gap of economic growth hinders the incentives of foreign 
                                                 
3 Obviously, they are still subject to the constraints of government regulations, FDI quota, market 
restricting, and constraints on the joint venture ownership share on, which we do not have 
quantitative control variables. 
  Chapter 5 
 86
investment. Besides, lack of the discipline and excessive intervention of local 
government coexist in Northwest regions (Li and Ma, 1996). The potential bank 
loans’ increase apparently seems to be able to attract foreign investment project, but 
in the Northwest region, it leads to a decrease of foreign direct investment. It is 
because of the keen competition between domestic firms and foreign firms. An 
increase of bank loans provides a source of capital inputs to local enterprises to 
invest in the market, which in turn deters foreign competitors from investing. 
 
5.3.4 (c) Domestic Investment as Determinant Variable (ID=>FDI) 
Again, we consider the impact of domestic investment on foreign direct investment 
that may appear in either positive or negative sign. In the previous aggregate time 
series VARs in Chapter 4 we showed that there was a negative impact of domestic 
investment on foreign direct investment but the reverse causality did not exist from 
foreign direct investment to domestic investment. Recalling the discussion in 
Section 5.3.3(c), there is a possibility of foreign direct investment crowding out 
domestic investment in some provinces. Meanwhile, a complementary effect was 
found in other provinces. 
 
Yet the signs of significant impact in provinces varied. There are three cases in 
China. First, Bejing, Fujian and Hebei show that there is a crowding out effect 
between domestic investment and foreign direct investment. Investment projects 
either from local or from foreign firms can crowd out their competitors given the 
financial resource constraint and competition.  
 
Second, positive impacts are found in Shanghai and Guangdong for both the 
causality from domestic investment to foreign direct investment and its reverse 
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causality. This implies a strong complementary effect between the composition of 
investments in these two areas. Different natures of investment can assist each other 
for establishment and development. 
 
Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant 
Statistic impact
For equation FDI:
Coefficient of GDP(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 15.93** GDP ==> FDI (+ + / -)
Northeast 5.26 GDP =\=> FDI
Other Coastal 33.38*** GDP ==> FDI (+ + + + + + / -)
Central 31.26*** GDP ==> FDI
Southwest 11.08 GDP =\=> FDI
Northwest 30.20*** GDP ==> FDI (+ + / - -)
National 127.11*** GDP ==> FDI
Coefficient of LOANS(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 5.25 LOANS =\=> FDI
Northeast 8.62 LOANS =\=> FDI
Other Coastal 20.44 LOANS =\=> FDI
Central 10.7 LOANS ==\> FDI
Southwest 20.24** LOANS ==> FDI (+ + + / -)
Northwest 24.13** LOANS ==> FDI (-)
National 89.39** LOANS ==> FDI
Coefficient of i (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 10.18 i  =\=> FDI
Northeast 25.74*** i ==> FDI (+)
Other Coastal 10.19 i =\=> FDI
Central 14.44 i =\=> FDI
Southwest 19.53** i ==> FDI (+++ / -)
Northwest 25.05** i ==> FDI (+)
National 105.12*** i ==> FDI
Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 16.72** π ==> FDI (++ / -)
Northeast 4.2 π =\=> FDI
Other Coastal 14.31 π =\=> FDI
Central 14.82 π =\=> FDI
Southwest 4.8 π =\=> FDI
Northwest 40.46*** π ==> FDI (+ / - - -)
National 95.32*** π ==> FDI
Coefficient of ID (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 43.69*** ID ==> FDI (+ / - -)
Northeast 15.49** ID ==> FDI (+ / - -)
Other Coastal 27.11** ID ==> FDI (+ / - - - - - -)
Central 13.85 ID =\=> FDI
Southwest 14.37 ID =\=> FDI
Northwest 7.19 ID =\=> FDI
National 121.7*** ID ==> FDI
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
          Null hypothesis of Fujian in Other Coastal  is to test all coeffiecients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
Table 5.4d Causality Test of Panel VAR Model 2: for equation of Foreign Direct Investment
Null Hypothesis: Regions Conclusion
System Estimation: Panel VAR Model 2
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Finally, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hainan and Shandong all have a negative impact 
in the causality from domestic investment to foreign direct investment. The result is 
consistent with Song, Sun, and Qiao (2001) who examined a panel data of the 
behavior of investment pattern in China. The long established domestic investment 
hinders new foreign direct investment inflows. On the reverse causality, these 4 
areas have a positive impact of foreign direct investment on domestic investment. 
The complementary effects suggest that the benefits of foreign direct investment 
help them not only to adsorb foreign capital, but also to gain skills like managerial, 
financial, organizational and most important technological. This, in turn, encourages 
domestic investment to expand in these areas. 
 
5.3.4 (d) Economic Output as Determinant Variable (GDP => FDI) 
There is no Granger causality from GDP to FDI in the previous chapter’s aggregate 
time series VARs. It is because of the neutralization effects of the aggregation of 
data. However, panel VARs provide significant results of this pair of causality. A rise 
in aggregate output raises the demand for investment as people are willing to invest 
in a favorite, strong economic environment. Therefore, positive impacts occur in 
regions like Coastal metropolis, Other Coast, Central and Northwest regional blocks. 
But when considering the negative impact in Shanghai and Guangdong, it is a 
different story. An increase in aggregate output no longer leads to an increase in 
foreign direct investment because of the saturation of the existing investment in 
these locations. Investors realize that there is no space and opportunity for further 
investment. They would rather invest in other regions which provide more resources 
and favorable conditions, such as the recent Western Exploration Project in China 
that aimed at targeting investment inflow to the Southwest and Northwest regions. 
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5.3.4 (e) Inflation Rate as Determinant Variable (Inflation => FDI) 
The Granger causality from interest rate to FDI provides similar results to that from 
inflation rate to domestic investment. Inflation rate negatively affects foreign direct 
investment in the Coastal Metropolis and Northwest regions. As the confidence of 
the foreign investors is affected by the uncertainty of future return on investments 
and an increase in inflation worsens business environments, hence, there is a 
negative impact of inflation rate on foreign direct investment. 
 
5.3.5 Determinants of Economic Output 
5.3.5 (a) Interest Rate as a Determinant Variable (Interest Rate => GDP) 
Despite the fact that interest rate shows no causality to economic output in the 
previous chapter’s aggregate quarterly times series VARs, panel data provides 
significant results which are consistent with the Keynesian theory and a reduced 
form of monetary transmission mechanism that indicates that an increase in interest 
rate will in turn negatively affect Gross Domestic Product. Northeast, Other Coastal 
and Central regions all obtain significant results in this pair of causality and these 
are the attributes of the significant effects in the national panel model. It implies the 
Gross Domestic Product is sensitively affected by the level of interest rate in these 
regions. 
 
5.3.5 (b) Bank Loans as a Determinant Variable (Bank Loans=>GDP) 
It is expected that a supply of bank loans can finally generate Gross Domestic 
Product. This conclusion has been found in Northeast and Southwest region blocks 
in China. An increase in bank loans can in turn boost investment in these regions. As 
we have already pointed out, investment can positively affect aggregate output (c.f. 
Sub-section 3.3c). Therefore, bank loans can directly affect Gross Domestic Product 
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in a positive way. Recall that the Northeast region is the historical industrialized area 
which gave substantial contribution to Chinese industrialization in the early 20th 
century. The underlying implication is that industrial loans definitely can directly 
and positively affect Gross Domestic Product of the industrial sector. This 
implication is supported by the evidence of the Northeast in panel VAR model 4. 
 
Nevertheless, Heilongjiang and Yuannan have a negative causality and the 
remaining provinces have no Granger causality from bank loans to Gross Domestic 
Product. It may be due to the non-performing loans (NPLs) problem (Zhao, Ma, et al, 
2002). The supply of loans is not necessarily turned into an increase of Gross 
Domestic Product because NPLs deteriorate quality of the banking sector and 
financial sector which will spread risks and financial losses from economic activity. 
In addition, there is a failure of market discipline in the China banking system 
although there is an economic reform of transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy. Decisions of banks issuing credits are still largely governed by the 
administrative commands from local or central officials. The aim of bank lending is 
not profit-maximization oriented, but policies oriented. This situation is especially 
serious in the state owned enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, Gross Domestic Product 
conversely decreased.  
 
5.3.5 (c) Domestic Investment as Determinant Variable (ID => GDP) 
We pointed out in the previous sub-section that bank loans can positively affect 
aggregate output. An increase in bank loans leads to a rise of Gross Domestic 
Product in the Northeast region through investment. Besides, Southwest regions 
have the same result. Both significant results in these two blocks make the national 
panel model to be significant too. 
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Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant
Statistic impact
For equation GDP:
Coefficient of LOANS(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 5.74 LOANS   =\=>  GDP
Northeast 19.93** LOANS  ==> GDP (++ / -)
Other Coastal 4.07 LOANS   =\=>  GDP
Central 12.64 LOANS   =\=>  GDP
Southwest 23.54** LOANS  ==> GDP (+++ / -)
Northwest 6.56 LOANS   =\=>  GDP
National 72.49** LOANS  ==> GDP
Coefficient of i(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 11.26 i =\=> GDP
Northeast 43.53** i ==>GDP (+ / - -)
Other Coastal 25.45* i ==>GDP (+ / - - - - - -)
Central 38.56*** i ==>GDP (+ / - - - - -)
Southwest 6.54 i =\=> GDP
Northwest 9.79 i =\=> GDP
National 135.14*** i ==>GDP
Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 9.022 π =\=> GDP
Northeast 3.69 π =\=> GDP
Other Coastal 17.17 π =\=> GDP
Central 12.4 π =\=> GDP
Southwest 73.44*** π ==> GDP (++ / - -)
Northwest 10.25 π =\=> GDP
National 125.98*** π ==> GDP
Coefficient of ID (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 8.65 ID =\=> GDP
Northeast 13.86* ID ==> GDP (+)
Other Coastal 19.74 ID =\=> GDP
Central 9.22 ID =\=> GDP
Southwest 458.6*** ID ==> GDP (+++ / -)
Northwest 2.54 ID =\=> GDP
National 512.61*** ID ==> GDP
Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 18.47** FDI ==> GDP (+ / - -)
Northeast 24.85*** FDI ==> GDP (+ /- -)
Other Coastal 22.36 FDI =/=> GDP
Central 4.24 FDI =/=> GDP
Southwest 471*** FDI ==> GDP
Northwest 12.48 FDI =/=> GDP
National 553.34*** FDI ==> GDP
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
          Null hypothesis of Fujian in Other Coastal  is to test all coeffiecients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
Table 5.4e Causality Test ofPanel VAR Model 2: for equation of Gross Domestic Product
Null Hypothesis: Regions Conclusion
System Estimation: Panel VAR Model 2
 
5.3.5 (d) Foreign Direct Investment as Determinant Variable (FDI => GDP) 
The implication behind the causality of foreign direct investment to Gross Domestic 
Product is similar to that of the causality from domestic investment to economic 
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output. Coastal Metropolis, Northeast and Southwest all have positive impact.  
 
However, there is a negative impact in Beijing, Tianjin., Jilin and Heilongjiang. Both 
foreign direct investment and domestic investment have impacts on Gross Domestic 
Product. Due to keen competition between foreign direct investment and domestic 
investment, the expansion of foreign direct investment crowds out the domestic 
investment, which largely contributes to the increase of Gross Domestic Product in 
these locations. Therefore, an increase of foreign direct investment leads reductions 
in size of Gross Domestic Product. 
 
5.3.5 (e) Inflation Rate as Determinant Variable (Inflation => GDP) 
In the aggregate time series model of Chapter 4, an 1% increase in inflation rate led 
to a 0.35% decrease in Gross Domestic Product. In the panel model, only  the 
Southwest region shows there is Granger Causality from inflation rate to Gross 
Domestic Product at the 1% significance level. The negative effect of inflation rate 
on aggregate output is also provided by the panel VARs. An increase in inflation rate 
deteriorates people’s motivation to spend. Gross Domestic Product is hence reduced. 
 
5.3.6 Determinants of Inflation Performance 
Based on Table 5.4f, we will discuss determinants of inflation performance in the 
bank lending channel. 
 
5.3.6 (a) Interest Rate as Determinant Variable (Interest Rate => Inflation) 
Interest Rate has negative impact on inflation rate. As interest rate is one of the 
monetary policies to target the inflation rate, the aggregate time series VARs in the 
previous chapter only provided the result at the 10% significance level. The panel 
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VARs suggest that interest rate does Granger cause inflation. There are significant 
positive impacts in various provinces.  
 
5.3.6 (b) Bank Loans as Determinant Variable (Bank Loans => Inflation) 
From the empirical findings of panel data, it is found that bank loans have positive 
impact on inflation rate. In this pair of causality, 13 out of 20 provinces have 
positive responses. The best example is the Northeast region. This result reinforces 
the findings of positive impacts of bank loans on Gross Domestic Product, which in 
turn affect inflation rate. Aggregate output is the key factor to causing economic 
growth and finally accelerating the inflation rate. Therefore, the linkage is simple: an 
increase in bank loans increases investment and Gross Domestic Product. Then, the 
pace of economic growth leads to pressure for inflation. 
 
5.3.6 (c) Domestic Investment as Determinant Variable (ID=>inflation) 
No Granger Causality is found in this pair of variables in the previous chapter’s 
aggregate time series VARs.  
 
From Table 5.4f, both positive and negative causalities are found in the panel VARs. 
Let us take Southwest and Northwest as examples. Provinces in these regions 
consistently show a positive causality from domestic investment to inflation rate. 
The reason is that investment of domestic firm can speed up the pace of economic 
growth, which in turn leads to an increase of inflation rate. On the other hand, 
negative impacts of domestic investment on inflation in other provinces may be due 
to an expansion of production capacity and excessive competition. 
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Wald Test
Chi squared Signs of significant
Statistic impact
For equation π :
Coefficient of GDP(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 16.93** GDP ==> π (+ + / -)
Northeast 3.16 GDP =\=> π
Other Coastal 76.86*** GDP ==> π (+ + + + + / - -)
Central 325.10*** GDP ==> π (+ / - - - - -)
Southwest 9.15 GDP =\=> π
Northwest 460.58*** GDP ==> π (+ + / - -)
National 891.78*** GDP ==> π
Coefficient of LOANS(-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 10.2 LOANS =\=> π
Northeast 12.92* LOANS ==> π (+)
Other Coastal 55.61*** LOANS ==> π (+ + + + + / - -)
Central 74.17*** LOANS ==> π (+ + + / - - -)
Southwest 6.74 LOANS =\=> π
Northwest 461.97*** LOANS ==> π (+ + / - -)
National 621.6*** LOANS ==> π
Coefficient of i (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 12.42 i  =\=> π
Northeast 23.13*** i  ==> π (+)
Other Coastal 42.24*** i  ==> π (+ + + + / - - -)
Central 482.35*** i  ==> π (+)
Southwest 23.10*** i  ==> π (+ + + / -)
Northwest 464.87*** i  ==> π (+)
National 1048.11*** i  ==> π
Coefficient of ID (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 2.33 ID =\=> π
Northeast 9.04 ID =\=> π
Other Coastal 72.19*** ID ==> π (+ + + + / - - -)
Central 169.69*** ID ==> π (+ + + / - - -)
Southwest 11.56*** ID ==> π (+)
Northwest 460.24*** ID ==> π (+)
National 725.03*** ID ==> π
Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero Costal Metropolis 22.79*** FDI ==> π (+ + / -)
Northeast 7.52 FDI =\=> π
Other Coastal 86.05*** FDI ==> π (+ + / - - - - -)
Central 11.08 FDI =\=> π
Southwest 7.68 FDI ==> π
Northwest 459.06*** FDI ==> π (+ + / - -)
National 594.19*** FDI ==> π
Note: =\=> means no Granger Causality
          ==> means there is Granger Causality
          ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
          Null hypothesis of Fujian in Other Coastal  is to test all coeffiecients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
Table 5.4f Causality Test of Panel VAR Model 2: for equation of Inflation Rate
Null Hypothesis: Regions Conclusion
System Estimation: Panel VAR Model 2
 
5.3.6 (d) Foreign Direct Investment as Determinant Variable (FDI=>inflation) 
Similarly, no Granger Causality is found in the impact of foreign direct investment 
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on inflation rate in the aggregate time series model of Chapter 4.  
 
From Table 5.4f, both positive and negative causalities are found in panel VARs. 
There are two possibilities associated with the result of causality. First, the amount 
of foreign direct investment is large enough in certain provinces so that it can 
stimulate economic growth. Therefore, an increase in foreign direct investment leads 
to a rise of inflation rate. Second, negative causality can be explained as the foreign 
direct investment increases production capacity and creates excessive competition in 
the domestic market (Ma, 2001a). 
 
5.3.6 (e) Economic Output as Determinant Variable (GDP=>inflation) 
The aggregate time series VARs in Chapter 4 found that the aggregate output has no 
impact on inflation rate.  
 
However, it is found that there are two possibilities generated from the panel data. 
First, the positive effects in various provinces indicate that fast economic growth can 
accelerate inflation from the demand side, and thus an increase of Gross Domestic 
Product leads to a rise of inflation rate. Second, the growth rate of economic output 
in some provinces creates excess supply which in turn decreases the inflation rate. 
 
5.3.7 Sensitivity Analysis of Institutional Changes 
Similar to section 4.3.4, we employ the dummy variable, DUMMYGOV, into the 
Panel VAR Model 2 to test the sensitivity of the panel model. The results are listed 
as the following Table 5.4 (g). In the empirical findings without dummy variable of 
Granger causality from loans to GDP and its reverse causality, it was found that 
although there is two-way Granger causality at the national level, yet only some of 
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the regions (Northeast regions, for example) have shown the significance result for 
existence of Granger causality.  
 
On the other hand, the estimation of Panel VAR Model 2 with dummy variable has 
shown a change of the result. The DUMMYGOV has significant impacts on the bank 
lending channel. Overall, the dummy variable increases the significance of the 
national level from 5% to 1%. Specifically, in Other Coastal region, it is found that 
there is a Granger causality from GDP to loans initially; however, after adding the 
dummy variable, the Granger causality is no longer existed. There is evidence to 
show that the government interventions aimed at controlling overheated economy do 
affect the lending and borrowing behaviors of the credits. Although considerable 
economic growth should enhance the investment activity, the institutional factor to 
prohibit the overheated economy with a symptom of a bubble can effectively halt the 
availability and accessibility of bank loans. Conversely, regions like Central and 
Northwest have insignificant results without dummy variable. Yet, the factor of 
institutional change allows these regions have Granger causality. The negative signs 
of some specific provinces suggest that there are severe non-performing loan (NPL) 
problems associate with the lending activity. It is crystal clear that government 
interventions affect the operation of bank lending channel. The consolidation of the 
PBOC provincial offices and the AMCs may have helped to solve the problem of 
NPLs in the banking sector. However, it is only established to become effective from 
1998. Therefore, the negative signs can still be expected in these regions. 
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Null Hypothesis: LOANS → YGDP YGDP → LOANS LOANS → YGDP YGDP → LOANS DUMMYGOV → YGDP DUMMYGOV → LOANS
p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2
METROPOLIS
VARBeijing 0.361291 0.00017 0.376531 8.62489E-09 0.178156 0.05644
VARTianjin 0.182484 0.712829 0.245414 0.63483 0.586105 0.559473
VARShanghai 0.858601 0.594905 0.934816 0.894003 0.53624 0.147502
Result of Fisher Test: 5.74 19.08*** 4.763127193 38.04602316*** 4.518704065 6.910674324
NORTHEAST
VARLiaoning 0.933248 0.01129 0.900337 0.000512 0.725902 0.000001
VARJilin 0.932118 0.055721 0.440277 0.065794 0.096695 0.4662
VARHeilongjiang 0.000054 0.830068 0.000001 0.719428 0.154561 0.361114
Result of Fisher Test: 19.93** 15.12** 29.48169581*** 21.25542278*** 9.047400564 31.19442538***
OTHER COASTAL
VARGuangdong 0.577579 0.548004 0.789044 0.505998 0.318146 0.379018
VARFujian 0.764597 3.91E-14 0.235188 0.091985 0.655107 0.537467
VARJiangsu 0.840142 0.96832 0.220122 0.395322 0.626497 0.692895
VARZhejiang 0.963075 0.449916 0.835935 0.53057 0.507857 0.635703
VARHainan 0.725409 0.329407 0.844005 0.348856 0.512188 0.460596
VARShandong 0.758904 0.858243 0.20565 0.416745 0.189877 0.15129
VARHebei 0.664122 0.82532 0.964477 0.80986 0.319345 0.068283
Result of Fisher Test: 4.07 67.52*** 10.32885355 13.53696209 12.37058763 15.51769057
CENTRAL
VARHenan 0.067471 0.708851 0.052749 0.78201 0.343947 0.052388
VARHubei 0.618074 0.774985 0.618082 0.43212 0.775018 0.788644
VARHunan 0.097675 0.406684 0.000203 0.3318419 0.00804 0.126426
VARAnhui 0.633554 0.204209 0.932946 0.006566 0.592761 0.000994
VARJiangxi 0.75268 0.084707 0.218203 0.009384 0.180857 0.145549
VARShanxi 0.925325 0.967969 0.989856 0.369787 0.980577 0.103373
Result of Fisher Test: 12.64 11.18 27.05516481** 25.75492815** 16.79617928 32.73008682***
With DummyWithout dummy
Table 5.4(g) Sensitivity Analysis of Banking Institutional Changes in Panel Model
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SOUTHWEST
VARGuangxi 0.013023 0.009821 0.109825 5.69911E-12 0.478369 4.95985E-08
VARSichuan 0.001461 0.010862 0.000229 0.100007 0.220613 0.691306
VARGuizhou 0.608382 0.105258 0.762462 0.322549 0.977129 0.190488
VARYuannan 0.66823 0.347748 0.817094 0.27162 0.834495 0.713838
Result of Fisher Test: 23.54*** 24.91*** 22.12771877*** 61.25615606*** 4.905566496 38.36748651***
NORTHWEST
VARShannxi 0.94854 0.351504 0.841553 0.324038 0.030332 0.535705
VARGansu 0.56988 0.330579 0.000161 0.027607 1.33227E-15 1.12865E-08
VARQinghai 0.391991 0.867454 0.950207 0.305491 0.437687 0.048609
VARXingjiang 0.177598 0.427618 0.168291 0.478301 0.001036 0.630166
Result of Fisher Test: 6.56 6.29 21.47949711** 13.2798608* 90.89217062*** 44.81909039***
NATIONAL
Result of Fisher Test: 72.49** 144.08*** 115.2360572*** 173.129353*** 138.5306087*** 169.539454***
Note: ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance
           Null Hypothesis of VARFUJIAN is to test all coefficients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes
           provice j
           Fisher test statistic: -2 Σ log pj ～ χ2, with 2N degrees of freedom, N is the number of provinces in panel VAR, pj is the p-value of
 
Denotes at the 1%,5%, and 10% significance level to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality 
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5.3.8 Comparison of Time Series and Panel Model 
The unsatisfactory results of the aggregate time series model have put the motivation 
of doing the panel model forwards. The results of panel model are relatively more 
fruitful. Yet, this does not imply that the panel estimation is superior to the time 
series estimation. Because, for example, the panel model cannot provide the 
aggregate impact of the Granger causality whilst it can be estimated in the aggregate 
time series model easily. Besides, it should be cautious that these two models are not 
strictly comparable. The reason is that different time periods were chosen for 
conducting the time series analysis (from 1994Q1 to 2003Q3) and the unbalanced 
panel analysis (the longest data available from 1978 to 2003). Due to the constraints 
of data availability, the time series can merely commence from 1994Q1. Despite 
panel data provide longer time periods for estimation, it should be feasible to choose 
the same time period for the panel approach to make these two models more 
comparable. However, the shorter estimation period for the panel model would 
deteriorate the power of the Fisher test. Therefore, the final estimation of two 
models are in different time periods. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory results obtained from the aggregate time series 
model in Chapter 4, empirical results of panel VARs in this chapter provide affluent 
and comprehensible findings for the bank lending channel in China. 
 
The unbalanced panel VAR model in this chapter is estimated by formulating the 
individual time series VARs in every province or metropolis. The Granger causality 
test is conducted by adopting the Fisher Equation reviewed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999). 
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The panel models provide supportive empirical results to explain the bank lending 
channel of China in Section 5.3. This research not only has examined the effects at 
the national level of China, but also has investigated the origins of the effects 
attributed to each province. The results have successfully explained the transmission 
mechanism underlying the bank lending channel. Moreover, comparisons of 
similarities and differences of the results of Granger causalities between the 
aggregate time series model and panel model, as well as models of individual 
regions, are useful to explain the latest economic conditions in China. 
 
In addition, sensitivity analysis of institutional change: cross-provincial office of the 
PBOC and those 4 AMCs under the supervision of the PBOC, provide alternative 
explanations of the bank lending channel of China; such changes have impact on 
China’s banking system to prohibit the overheated economy and to tackle the NPLs 
problems. Similarly, the institutional change affects only some of the regions, but 
overall, it does have impacts on the whole banking sector in the national level. 
 
Last but not lest, the different time periods in respective time series and unbalance 
panel analysis lead the results from the two models less comparable. It is due to the 
constraints of the data availability. 
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Statistical Appendix:  
Results of VAR of Beijing (VARBeijing) in the Panel VAR Model 2 
 
Table 5.5 Vector Autoregressive Model of Beijing with 1 lag: all variables below refer to the 
variables of Beijing 
 
Vector Autogression Estimates VARBeijing with 1 lag 
Sample(adjusted): 1986 2002     
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints    
t-statistics in [ ]      
      Dependent Variables     
  GDP LOANS i π ID FDI 
Independent variables       
GDP(-1) 1.034197 2.884484 6.897528 -1.931891 9.420255 4.834729
 [ 3.13827] [ 2.64215] [ 0.42145] [-0.73817] [ 5.27582] [ 0.63311]
       
LOANS(-1) -0.08179 0.334789 0.628174 0.183203 -0.094535 -1.186829
 [-1.48911] [ 1.83993] [ 0.23029] [ 0.42000] [-0.31766] [-0.93248]
       
i(-1) -0.001818 -0.020016 0.232842 0.014141 0.061499 0.068914
 [-0.27125] [-0.90163] [ 0.69965] [ 0.26572] [ 1.69379] [ 0.44379]
       
π(-1) -0.004592 -0.335512 3.722259 0.242148 -0.724171 0.081619
 [-0.08090] [-1.78436] [ 1.32052] [ 0.53721] [-2.35480] [ 0.06206]
       
ID(-1) -0.006239 -0.045513 -3.780709 -0.060104 -0.283238 -0.120062
 [-0.14199] [-0.31266] [-1.73252] [-0.17224] [-1.18968] [-0.11791]
       
FDI(-1) -0.027439 -0.096238 1.599336 0.069895 -0.076844 0.074602
 [-1.72331] [-1.82450] [ 2.02256] [ 0.55275] [-0.89073] [ 0.20219]
       
C 0.149955 -6.979916 -3.711979 5.913569 -26.78519 -13.729 
 [ 0.15373] [-2.15996] [-0.07662] [ 0.76337] [-5.06791] [-0.60737]
       
TIME 0.015965 -0.154421 -0.827416 0.14513 -0.730703 -0.10585 
 [ 0.59058] [-1.72436] [-0.61633] [ 0.67603] [-4.98887] [-0.16898]
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 R-squared 0.999046 0.995897 0.873559 0.424433 0.982932 0.889598
 Adj. R-squared 0.998303 0.992705 0.775216 -0.02323 0.969657 0.803729
 Sum sq. resids 0.003743 0.041078 9.231704 0.236068 0.109884 2.009893
 S.E. equation 0.020393 0.067559 1.012791 0.161956 0.110496 0.472569
 F-statistic 1345.947 312.055 8.882772 0.948108 74.04376 10.36002
 Log likelihood 47.45727 27.09469 -18.93211 12.23124 18.73114 -5.973332
 Akaike AIC -4.642032 -2.246434 3.168484 -0.497793 -1.262486 1.643921
 Schwarz SC -4.249931 -1.854334 3.560584 -0.105693 -0.870386 2.036022
 Mean dependent 4.820175 5.113696 8.517647 0.210422 3.987653 1.690321
 S.D. dependent 0.495106 0.791011 2.136175 0.160107 0.634334 1.066688
              
 Determinant Residual Covariance 4.91E-13     
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 96.17442     
 Akaike Information Criteria -5.667579     
 Schwarz Criteria -3.314976         
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Table 5.6  System Estimation of VAR of Beijing (VARBeijing) in the Panel VAR 
Model 2 
 
System: VARBeijing in Panel Model 2 
Estimation Method: Least Squares (Marquardt)  
(all variables below refer to the variables of Beijing) 
Sample: 1987 2002    
Included observations: 16    
Total system (balanced) observations 96  
     
Equation: GDP = C(1)*GDP(-1) + C(2)*GDP(-2) + C(3)  
        *LOANS(-1) + C(4)*LOANS(-2) + C(5)   
        *i(-1) + C(6)*i(-2) + C(7)    
        *π(-1) + C(8)*π(-2) + C(9)    
        *ID(-1) + C(10)*ID(-2) + C(11)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(12)*FDI(-2) + C(13) + C(14)*TIME     
Observations: 16     
R-squared 0.999908     Mean dependent var 4.866938 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999307     S.D. dependent var 0.470975 
S.E. of regression 0.012395     Sum squared resid 0.000307 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.328679       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 1.816612 0.857355 2.118856 0.0556 
GDP(-2) -0.410902 1.251645 -0.32829 0.7484 
LOANS(-1) -0.116437 0.127545 -0.912908 0.3793 
LOANS(-2) 0.060063 0.058605 1.024891 0.3256 
i(-1) 0.007794 0.009178 0.849253 0.4124 
i(-2) 0.008196 0.008998 0.910828 0.3803 
π(-1) -0.093998 0.119057 -0.789525 0.4451 
π(-2) -0.116981 0.068527 -1.707083 0.1135 
ID(-1) -0.008622 0.066653 -0.129358 0.8992 
ID(-2) -0.042165 0.046201 -0.912627 0.3794 
FDI(-1) -0.046741 0.014286 -3.271874 0.0067 
FDI(-2) -0.0061 0.037305 -0.163516 0.8728 
Constant Term -1.159809 2.038018 -0.569087 0.5798 
TIME -0.013689 0.057071 -0.239865 0.8145 
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Equation: LOANS = C(15)*GDP(-1) + C(16)*GDP(-2) + C(17)  
        *LOANS(-1) + C(18)*LOANS(-2) + C(19)   
        *i(-1) + C(20)*i(-2) + C(21)    
        *π(-1) + C(22)*π(-2) + C(23)    
        *ID(-1) + C(24)*ID(-2) + C(25)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(26)*FDI(-2) + C(27) + C(28)*TIME     
Observations: 16     
R-squared 0.999686     Mean dependent var 5.172976 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997642     S.D. dependent var 0.776974 
S.E. of regression 0.037725     Sum squared resid 0.002846 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.437439       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 9.81041 2.609357 3.759703 0.0027 
GDP(-2) -11.15183 3.809376 -2.927469 0.0127 
LOANS(-1) 0.934771 0.388183 2.408071 0.033 
LOANS(-2) 0.783303 0.178363 4.391635 0.0009 
i(-1) 0.010746 0.027933 0.384714 0.7072 
i(-2) 0.033252 0.027386 1.214191 0.248 
π(-1) -1.316171 0.362349 -3.632329 0.0034 
π(-2) 0.411579 0.208561 1.973421 0.0719 
ID(-1) -0.151669 0.202859 -0.747655 0.4691 
ID(-2) 0.151032 0.140614 1.074086 0.3039 
FDI(-1) -0.092161 0.043479 -2.119673 0.0556 
FDI(-2) 0.332943 0.113538 2.932447 0.0125 
Constant Term 2.042442 6.202699 0.329283 0.7476 
TIME -0.030697 0.173696 -0.176726 0.8627 
     
Equation: i = C(29)*GDP(-1) + C(30)*GDP(-2) + C(31)  
        *LOANS(-1) + C(32)*LOANS(-2) + C(33)   
        *i(-1) + C(34)*i(-2) + C(35)    
        *π(-1) + C(36)*π(-2) + C(37)    
        *ID(-1) + C(38)*ID(-2) + C(39)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(40)*FDI(-2) + C(41) + C(42)*TIME   
Observations: 16         
R-squared 0.961659     Mean dependent var 8.555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.712445     S.D. dependent var 2.200491 
S.E. of regression 1.179995     Sum squared resid 2.784777 
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Durbin-Watson stat 2.806697       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 80.31474 81.61703 0.984044 0.3445 
GDP(-2) -110.2365 119.1519 -0.925176 0.3731 
LOANS(-1) 4.736033 12.14181 0.39006 0.7033 
LOANS(-2) 6.104649 5.578931 1.094233 0.2953 
i(-1) 0.63331 0.87371 0.724852 0.4824 
i(-2) 0.331642 0.856609 0.387157 0.7054 
π(-1) -5.928956 11.33377 -0.523123 0.6104 
π(-2) 2.168758 6.523494 0.332453 0.7453 
ID(-1) -2.494198 6.345156 -0.393087 0.7011 
ID(-2) -0.240222 4.398208 -0.054618 0.9573 
FDI(-1) 0.967434 1.359951 0.711374 0.4905 
FDI(-2) 2.172031 3.551295 0.611617 0.5522 
Constant Term 73.54223 194.0117 0.379061 0.7113 
TIME 0.691016 5.432969 0.127189 0.9009 
     
Equation: π = C(43)*GDP(-1) + C(44)*GDP(-2) +   
        C(45)*BANKLOANS(-1) + C(46)*BANKLOANS(-2) + C(47) 
        *i(-1) + C(48)*i(-2) + C(49)    
        *π(-1) + C(50)*π(-2) + C(51)    
        *ID(-1) + C(52)*ID(-2) + C(53)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(54)*FDI(-2) + C(55) + C(56)*TIME   
Observations: 16         
R-squared 0.966213     Mean dependent var 0.219274 
Adjusted R-squared 0.746597     S.D. dependent var 0.161005 
S.E. of regression 0.081048     Sum squared resid 0.013138 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.799526       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 16.3811 5.605901 2.922118 0.0128 
GDP(-2) -24.2903 8.184001 -2.968022 0.0117 
LOANS(-1) 1.462749 0.833965 1.753969 0.1049 
LOANS(-2) 1.444771 0.383191 3.770364 0.0027 
i(-1) 0.147995 0.060011 2.466126 0.0297 
i(-2) 0.129556 0.058837 2.201962 0.048 
π(-1) -2.247484 0.778465 -2.887073 0.0137 
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π(-2) -0.010599 0.448069 -0.023654 0.9815 
ID(-1) -0.223874 0.43582 -0.513684 0.6168 
ID(-2) 0.015781 0.302093 0.052241 0.9592 
FDI(-1) -0.077139 0.093409 -0.825823 0.425 
FDI(-2) 0.512 0.243922 2.09903 0.0576 
Constant Term 15.1905 13.32578 1.139933 0.2766 
TIME 0.247832 0.373166 0.664135 0.5192 
     
Equation: ID = C(57)*GDP(-1) + C(58)*GDP(-2) + C(59)  
        *LOANS(-1) + C(60)*LOANS(-2) + C(61)   
        *i(-1) + C(62)*i(-2) + C(63)    
        *π(-1) + C(64)*π(-2) + C(65)    
        *ID(-1) + C(66)*ID(-2) + C(67)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(68)*FDI(-2) + C(69) + C(70)*TIME   
Observations: 16         
R-squared 0.996202     Mean dependent var 4.033349 
Adjusted R-squared 0.971517     S.D. dependent var 0.625573 
S.E. of regression 0.105578     Sum squared resid 0.022293 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.15511       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 17.34159 7.302531 2.374737 0.0351 
GDP(-2) -1.027542 10.6609 -0.096384 0.9248 
LOANS(-1) 0.339342 1.086365 0.312364 0.7601 
LOANS(-2) 0.775463 0.499164 1.553522 0.1463 
i(-1) 0.004194 0.078174 0.053654 0.9581 
i(-2) 0.130133 0.076643 1.697899 0.1153 
π(-1) -0.983495 1.014068 -0.969852 0.3513 
π(-2) -0.398943 0.583677 -0.683499 0.5073 
ID(-1) -0.948155 0.567721 -1.670108 0.1208 
ID(-2) -0.811879 0.393521 -2.063112 0.0614 
FDI(-1) -0.137547 0.121679 -1.130408 0.2804 
FDI(-2) 0.309214 0.317745 0.973151 0.3497 
Constant Term -47.8862 17.35883 -2.758607 0.0173 
TIME -1.472147 0.486105 -3.028456 0.0105 
     
Equation: FDI = C(71)*GDP(-1) + C(72)*GDP(-2) + C(73)  
        *LOANS(-1) + C(74)*LOANS(-2) + C(75)   
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        *i(-1) + C(76)*(-2) + C(77)i    
        *π(-1) + C(78)*π(-2) + C(79)    
        *ID(-1) + C(80)*ID(-2) + C(81)*FDI(-1)   
        + C(82)*FDI(-2) + C(83) + C(84)*TIME   
Observations: 16         
R-squared 0.967995     Mean dependent var 1.812696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75996     S.D. dependent var 0.970628 
S.E. of regression 0.475548     Sum squared resid 0.452292 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.322724       
     
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
GDP(-1) 2.604063 32.89238 0.079169 0.9382 
GDP(-2) 23.23707 48.01927 0.483911 0.6372 
LOANS(-1) -5.586872 4.893255 -1.14175 0.2758 
LOANS(-2) -0.494515 2.248358 -0.219945 0.8296 
i(-1) 0.340959 0.352113 0.968323 0.352 
i(-2) -0.091208 0.345221 -0.264202 0.7961 
π(-1) 0.604907 4.567608 0.132434 0.8968 
π(-2) -4.571271 2.629025 -1.73877 0.1076 
ID(-1) -0.217213 2.557154 -0.084943 0.9337 
ID(-2) -0.005122 1.772517 -0.00289 0.9977 
FDI(-1) -0.485551 0.548072 -0.885925 0.3931 
FDI(-2) -0.971518 1.431203 -0.678812 0.5101 
Constant Term -68.13837 78.18842 -0.871464 0.4006 
TIME -1.076868 2.189534 -0.491825 0.6317 
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Table 5.7 Results of Panel VAR Model 2: Example of equation for LOANS    
Null Hypothesis: Coefficient of YGDP(-1) is zero Coefficient of i(-1) is zero Coefficient of π(-1) is zero Coefficient of ID(-1) is zero Coefficient of FDI (-1) is zero 
 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 p-values of χ2 
METROPOLIS      
VARBeijing 0.00017 0.70045 0.000281 0.454669 0.034034 
VARTianjin 0.712829 0.953989 0.484865 0.938533 0.210868 
VARShanghai 0.594905 0.718309 0.580774 0.714498 0.83444 
Result of Fisher Test: 19.08*** 1.47 18.89*** 2.38 10.23 
NORTHEAST      
VARLiaoning 0.01129 0.137659 0.436438 0.147425 0.650527 
VARJilin 0.055721 0.186699 0.177506 0.014705 0.478774 
VARHeilongjiang 0.830068 0.071532 0.983981 0.045652 0.969907 
Result of Fisher Test: 15.12** 12.6 5.15 18.44** 2.39 
OTHER COASTAL      
VARGuangdong 0.548004 0.646997 0.706033 0.585041 0.398345 
VARFujian 3.91E-14 0.000005 1.00E-99 1.00E-99 1.11E-16 
VARJiangsu 0.96832 0.008273 0.400376 0.944421 0.491144 
VARZhejiang 0.449916 0.112704 0.3968 0.435645 0.469595 
VARHainan 0.329407 0.661208 0.408747 0.405257 0.487043 
VARShandong 0.858243 0.347878 0.800651 0.795462 0.495863 
VARHebei 0.82532 0.115593 0.924565 0.134457 0.400307 
Result of Fisher Test: 67.52*** 46.49*** 462.68*** 465.04*** 89.92*** 
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CENTRAL      
VARHenan 0.708851 0.88709 14.19 0.224581 0.518204 
VARHubei 0.774985 0.93962 0.564473 0.825179 0.595107 
VARHunan 0.406684 0.493938 0.526055 0.590917 0.571097 
VARAnhui 0.204209 0.460593 0.227291 0.439087 0.851677 
VARJiangxi 0.084707 0.06727 0.907558 0.693988 0.952207 
VARShanxi 0.967969 0.697337 0.104449 0.246112 0.623541 
Result of Fisher Test: 11.18 9.44 14.19 9.6 4.84 
SOUTHWEST      
VARGuangxi 0.009821 0.512415 0.000284 0.277985 0.524705 
VARSichuan 0.010862 0.000815 0.138698 0.007876 0.247473 
VARGuizhou 0.105258 0.406704 0.133634 0.959136 0.62623 
VARYuannan 0.347748 0.714731 0.875778 0.758035 0.632868 
Result of Fisher Test: 24.91*** 18.03** 24.57*** 12.89 5.93 
NORTHWEST      
VARShannxi 0.351504 0.466078 0.275025 0.769077 0.557932 
VARGansu 0.330579 0.772636 0.244998 0.617976 0.890364 
VARQinghai 0.867454 0.685684 0.864589 0.884914 0.751182 
VARXingjinag 0.427618 0.808042 0.818009 0.732542 0.44839 
Result of Fisher Test: 6.29 3.22 6.09 2.35 3.58 
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NATIONAL 
Result of Fisher Test: 144.08*** 91.26** 531.57*** 510.7*** 109.9*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance   
    Null Hypothesis of VARFUJIAN is to test all coefficients from 1 lag to 2 lags are zeroes   
    Fisher test statistic: -2 Σ log pj ～ χ2, with 2N degrees of freedom, N is the number of provinces in panel VAR, pj is the p-value of province j.  





FDI Natural logarithm of Foreign Direct Investment deflated by GDP deflator 
FDI2 Natural logarithm of Foreign Direct Investment deflated by iGDP deflator 
GDP Real national Gross Domestic Product in natural logarithm 
ID Natural logarithm in Domestic Investment deflated by GDP deflator 
ID2 Natural logarithm in Domestic Investment deflated by iGDP deflator 
iGDP Real Industrial value-added in natural logarithm 
iLOANS Industrial Loans of National Banking System deflated by iGDP deflator 
LOANS Total Loans of National Banking System deflated by GDP deflator 
i Lending rate is the bank rate that meets the short and medium term  
 financial needs of the private sector 
π Inflation rate calculated as: △ p*4, where p is the GDP deflator 
π2 Inflation rate calculated as: △ p*4, where p is the iGDP deflator 
TIME Time Trend 
Note: Domestic investment equals to gross capital formation minus respective foreign direct investment. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Monetarism is at the heart of economics which aims at stabilizing the economy 
through conducting monetary policies to maintain a stable economic growth. The 
fundamental underlying assumptions of the bank lending channel is that a reduction 
or an increase of bank loans are actually the responses to monetary policies, and bank 
loans eventually affect output though the lending channel. There are already 
considerable amounts of empirical work that have examined the bank lending 
channel in developed economies such as the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Japan. The 
evidence for the importance of a bank lending channel is relatively little in China.  
 
In this research, we extended the traditional bank lending channel into a 
multi-directional causality cycle to examine the pattern of the credit channel in China. 
The background information of China, motivations, limitations and structure of this 
research are given in the first chapter. The second chapter reviews the literatures 
related to the bank lending channel. It also describes the investment issues on 
whether there is a crowding-out, or a crowding-in, relationship between domestic 
investment and foreign direct investment.  
 
The core of this research is the proposed framework of investigating the bank lending 
channel of China in Chapter 3. By expanding the traditional framework of 
Keynesians’ structural model and the monetarist’s reduced-form approach, a 
multi-directional causality cycle is developed to explain the bank lending channel of 
China. The analytical paradigm is composed of two parts – the times series model 
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and the unbalanced panel model. The empirical results of these two models are 
shown in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively. 
 
In Chapter 4, the time series model provides a quarterly aggregate analysis for the 
period of 1994Q1 to 2002Q3. The results are unsatisfactory in that only direct but 
weak causality from Gross Domestic Product to bank loans was found but no reverse 
causality. However, there are indirect links from banks loans to Gross Domestic 
Product. Surprisingly, we find that there is a crowding-out effect of domestic 
investments on foreign direct investment which is opposite to the findings from 
countries in the Ivory Coasts. A sensitivity analysis of institutional change, have been 
conducted for the VAR5. The results are that interventions from Chinese Government 
did have impact on the lending behavior of investors. Given the fact that the power 
of the aggregate times series model test is low, therefore it is believed that the panel 
data can provide more information that can be a complement to the time series model 
of China.  
 
In Chapter 5, the unbalanced panel VAR model comprises the annual data from 27 
provinces and 3 metropolises, for the period of 1978 to 2002. The results are far 
more satisfactory than those of the aggregate times series. Strong and direct 
causalities and reverse causalities are found in the bank lending channel, which 
strongly support the new analytical framework laid out in Chapter 3. Moreover, the 
panel data model gives different significance levels for Granger causality tests in 
various regions. The advantage of the regional blocks comparison is to avoid the 
problems of neutralization effect in the aggregate time series model. There is also a 
sensitivity analysis by adding a dummy variable in Panel VAR Model 2 to compare 
the findings with and without the dummy, DUMMYGOV. It is found that there are 
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drastic variations of the significances of Granger causality across different regions. 
Furthermore, the policies of consolidation of cross-provincial office of the PBOC 
and the setup of four AMCs aimed at targeting NPLs problem and controling the 
overheated economy have positive effects on the Chinese banking sector. Though the 
findings of panel approach provide lots of information, the two models are not 
strictly comparable. It is because the different time periods are adopted in the time 
series and unbalance panel models. 
 
The empirical findings are that: first, the unexpected negative sign in the causality 
from Gross Domestic Product to bank loans and its reverse causality indicate that the 
overheated economy in China is shading the confidence of people as they fear that 
there may be a bubble economy like the Southeast Asian Countries’ pre-financial 
crisis. It also may be related to the problem of the non-performing loans (NPLs) that 
hinder economic growth in some provinces. The more loans issued, the more NPLs 
may accumulate. Therefore, GDP growth may go down instead of up.  
 
Second, the decomposition of investment into domestic investment and foreign direct 
investment enables us to investigate their relationships in each region. There is 
evidence to show that both crowding out and complementary effects are occurring 
for these two types of investment activities in different provinces of China. 
Government should beware of these effects and implement appropriate measures to 
encourage investment.  
 
Third, various associated in different regions imply that mechanisms of transmission 
channel are different across regions. The reasons are government intervention 
(administrative commands), different paces of economic development (i.e. Coastal 
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regions developed first), lack of financial infrastructure in some areas and 
non-market discipline in the banking sector. 
 
6.2 Policy implications 
The reforms in the banking system, such as the decentralization of credit control and 
the development of financial institutions, help to channel the financial resources 
towards a broad range of sectors in the Chinese economy across different regions. 
However, according to the empirical results presented by this research, it is found, 
similar to the findings of Samolyk (1993), that the inequalities of regions in banking 
sectors result in differences in the transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy 
and have different distributional effects to provinces and metropolises.  
 
Harrison and McMillan (2002) claim that foreign firms can simply be more 
profitable and have access to more collateral and thus be a better investment for 
lending institutions. For domestic firms, there may be problems associated with 
asymmetric information for bank credits to the local firms. The state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) are not well-equipped to deal with these problems They 
simply do not have the experience and expertise to select profitable firms. The 
administrative commands of issuing loans to the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China have been rooted in the financial system for over a half century. Even after the 
economic reforms implemented after 1978, there are still lots of problems associated 
with the SOEs to the banking sector. There is lack of disciplinary control to both staff 
in both the SOEs and the banking sector to eliminate the non-performance loans 
(NPLs) problem. The state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have over 70% of the 
business in the banking sector and they are the main source of the NPLs.  
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Foreign direct investment remains an important channel for China’s economic 
growth. The spillover effects of these foreign investments should not be overlooked. 
The positive spillover effects are that foreign direct investment can contribute 
technology transfer and bring in advanced skills such as managerial, organizational 
and technological skills to China. Up to this point, we welcome the crowding-in 
effect of foreign enterprise to China through co-operative measures with local 
enterprises. However, there is a crowding-out effect as negative externalities. Foreign 
firms may crowd out local firms in local credit markets. Therefore, officials of both 
central and local governments should be concerned about the survival of domestic 
firms in the face of foreign firms’ competition. It is necessary to provide financial 
and infrastructure support for local investors within the frameworks of the WTO. 
 
Finally, it is important to further liberalize the banking sector to introduce market 
discipline in the financial sector in China. Meanwhile, the enforcement of 
supervision of the banking sector and abolishment of policy loans through the 
administrative commands can be a starting point to prohibit NPLs and to strengthen 
the banking system of China.  
 
6.3 Limitations of the Research 
The times series and panel model enable us to explore the bank lending channel on 
the macro level. Further investigation should be done on the micro level (i.e. firm 
level). Moreover, our analytical paradigm has no control variables such as 
government regulation, foreign direct investment quota, market restriction, and 
shares of ownership of firm. The results may be varied when considering these 
factors. This could be a future direction of the research. Data of bank loans include 
only national banking systems but not those of non-banking financial institutions, 
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which are increasingly play a significant role in bank lending channel of China. 
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